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Department of Sociology 
This research examines theoretical concepts of ethnic identity using survey 
data from probability samples of about 13,000 youth from 11 countries of the 
former Soviet Union (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Moldova, Tajikistan, Russia, and Ukraine). The focus is on the 
combined impact of different micro and macro factors on ethnic attitudes and 
perceptions during a period of rapid social change. 
The dependent variable is ethnic distinctiveness, which describes a group 
member's distancing of themselves from other ethnic groups, an important 
consequence of ethnic identity. The variable was measured through evaluations of 
six personal characteristics of ethnic majority and minority groups in each country. 
The continuous nature of this variable allows detailed study of how ethnic micro 
factors (self-identification, parents' ethnic identity, ethnic language, level of 
interaction with outsiders), macro factors ( ethnic conflict and level of ethnic 
homogeneity at the national, sub-national, and micro levels), and other social 
factors (parents' education, religious strength, gender, and family income) affect 
ethnic distinctiveness. Due to the nested nature of the data, the analysis was 
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conducted on three levels--individual, sub-national, and national--using different 
techniques for each level. 
The results show that at the individual level, ethnic self-identification is the 
strongest predictor of ethnic distancing, followed by parents' ethnic identification 
and ethnic language; out-group interaction has only a weak effect. At the second 
level, the micro-level (school) ethnic homogeneity has the strongest effect, while 
the regional homogeneity effect is not significant. Both national-level variables 
(national conflict and homogeneity on the societal level) have strong effects on the 
dependent variable, while class variables (parents' education and family income) 
have no effect on ethnic distinctiveness (possibly a legacy of the egalitarian Soviet 
system). 
The original model which presumes that ethnic distancing is a product of 
the strength of ethnic identity, family ethnic background, and out-group interaction 
thus seems applicable mostly to societies (1) in which the majority and minority are 
significantly differentiated from each other, (2) where the minority is significantly 
large, and (3) where both groups are involved in a major ethno-social process. 
Thus, the study confirms that the individual ethnic processes of ethnic boundary 
formation are quite susceptible to the pervasive social dynamics of the larger 
society. 
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This dissertation examines the process and consequences of ethnic 
identification using data on ethnic relations gathered from high school students in the 
former Soviet Union. The research is based on secondary analysis of survey data from 
probability samples of about 13,000 youth in the eleven countries of the former Soviet 
Union (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belorus, Georgia, Moldova, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Latvia, Russia, Tajikistan, and Ukraine). 
The dependent variable is ethnic distinctiveness, which describes the group 
members' distancing of themselves from other ethnic groups, one of the most 
important consequences of ethnic identity. Such distancing of an ethnic group from 
others on a social continuum is a crucial element in social identity. Indeed, the greater 
the distance, the more ethnic group members feel different from others and the more 
ethnicity becomes salient. From this perspective, the difference among ethnic 
identifiers becomes rather continuous, unlike its dichotomous treatment in most other 
ethnic studies ( e.g., "Whites" vs. "Blacks"). 
There is an important difference between this concept and the more commonly 
used concept of ethnic self-identification. Both describe ethnic identity and its different 
components, but while ethnic self-identification is the personally reported strength of 
ethnic identity (which emphasizes the "we" part of ethnic identity--belonging to a 
particular group), ethnic distinctiveness relates to the distance of "we" from "them." 
This methodological distinction is an important element in this research . 
Exploration of the connections between macro factors and the micro-level of 
individual psychological processes related to ethnic identity is the main focus of this 
research. Social identity theory and the contact hypothesis approach are 
complemented by adding macro-level variables that increase the salience of ethnic 
identity, making an initial ethnic "label" a crucial determinant of group status in 
ethnically structured societies where ethnicity is a central component of social identity. 
Ethnic Relations in the Soviet Union and Post-Soviet States 
The former Soviet Union is a convenient region for the study of ethnic 
relations . After the sudden and unexpected disintegration of the Soviet Union in 
September 199 l , all 15 Soviet republics became independent countries. Since the Soviet 
Union had been administratively divided into republics according to ethnic principles, the 
new successor states soon turned into ethnically based societies. Major ethnic groups 
suddenly became dominant ones, while Russians, who had been seen as a ruling nationality, 
became a subordinate minority. This provided something of a natural experiment, with 
various countries having a common economic and social system now experiencing different 
levels of ethnic tensions. 
The Bolshevik revolution in Russia in 1917, which at first sight completely 
destroyed the Tsarist regime, in fact continued many legacies of imperial 
authoritarianism. 1 However, among the new forms of social control introduced after 
the revolution was the ethnically structured system of territorial administration. 
Following various ideological and political motives, the communist government 
eventually divided its territory into 15 ethnically-defined Soviet republics. Inside the 
union republics, autonomous regions were created for smaller ethnic groups. Borders 
were drawn in a way that only vaguely reflected the borders of the previous state 
entities (if such ever existed) and often did not coincide with the ethnic population 
distribution. The majority group in each republic was the titular group (e.g., 
Ukrainjans in Ukraine, Latvians in Latvia). Usually this group was a majority, though 
its proportion in the population differed . 
While prior to the emergence of the Soviet Union in 1922, several new union 
republics had a history of statehood at some point in history, others were not part of 
larger nation-state and were completely new political creations,2 as shown in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Ethnic Distribution in the Union Republics of the USSR, 1989 
Union Entered Population Titular Two Largest 
Republic USSR in ml. Ethnic Minority Groups 
Group 
Russia 1922 183.0 82% Tatars 6% 
Ukrainian 3% 
Azerbaijan 1922 7.02 83% Annenians 6% 
Russian 6% 
Am1cnia 1922 3.30 94% Azeris 3% 
Russians 2% 
Georgia 1922 5.40 70% Am1enians 8% 
Azeris 6% 
Kyrgyzstan 1922 4.26 52% Russians 22% 
Uzbeks 13% 
Taj ikistan 1922 5.09 62% Uzbeks 24% 
Russians 8% 
Lithuania 1940 3.67 80% Russians 9% 
Poles 7% 
Estonia 1940 1.57 62% Russians 30% 
Ukrainians 3% 
Latvia 1940 2.7 52% Russians 34% 
Ukrainians 3% 
Moldova 1939 4.3 64% Ukrainians 14% 
Russians 1 3% 
Ukraine 1922 51.45 73% Russians 22% 
Belorusians 1 % 
Belarns 1922 10.15 76% Russians 13% 
Poles 4% 
Uzbekistan 1922 19.81 71% Russians 8% 
Tajiks 5% 
Tttrkmenistan 1922 3.5 1 72% Russi,ms J 0% 
Uzbeks 9% 
Kazakstan 1922 16.46 40% Russians 38% 
Ukrainians 5% 
Sources: 1989 Soviet Census; Rywkin (1994). 
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An important element in these arrangements was the definition of autonomy in 
ethnic terms. Each ethnic group with autonomous status was assigned a defined area 
of land; it had its own party and administrative structures which exercised some 
sovereignty within borders defined by the Center. Even in cases of initial artificiality, 
distinct political communities soon emerged within these republics, each with its own 
bureaucracy. New ethnic identities were formed, especially in Central Asia. For 
example, Atkin (1993) argues that though Tajik national identity was in some sense 
imposed on the Soviet Republic of Tajikistan created in 1924, this identity began to 
play an increasingly important role in social processes. 
The overwhelmingly Russian component in the power structure was slowly 
decreasing, replaced by the locals using a policy of"korenizatsiya" (appointing of local 
nationalities into administrative and party organs). As a result of these 
transformations, the Soviet state became dual in nature: it had a federal structure with 
nominal power sharing between different ethnic groups, within the dominant structure 
of the communist party (controlled overwhelmingly by Russians) that had the real 
power. 
Nevertheless, "korenizatsiya" helped to create a local political elite within the 
party organs. With the leader of the republic (the first secretary of the communist 
party of that republic), as a rule an individual belonging to the titular ethnic group, the 
impression was that that group was in fact in control of its autonomous territory 
(which, incidentally, gave Soviets excellent propaganda vehicles) . However, the key 
appointments to party and power positions were Moscow' s decisions, and the non-
Russians' perception that Russians were in control of the country was quite common 
throughout the Soviet Union.3 
Tight control from Moscow over non-Russian republics further weakened after 
the Khrushchev period: demographic trends significantly decreased the proportion of 
the Russian population in the non-Russian union republics . Such changes increased 
control of the republican leadership over local developments. 4 Local party leaders 
readily used the rise of liberalization and demands by dissident groups as a way to 
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press Moscow to give them more power. As a result, the ethnic nationalism of the 
late 1980s came from the party leadership of the republic and from grassroots 
movements as well. Many Western scholars and politicians ignored this very 
important phenomenon because they saw the demise of the USSR mostly as the result 
of purely anti-communist uprisings by dissident forces. 5 
Meanwhile, most Western explanations for the sudden eruption of ethnic 
conflicts in the former Soviet Union in the early 1990s reflected the influence of 
political scientists, economists, and historians who represented the overwhelming 
majority in 'Soviet studies, ' rather than that of experts in ethnic relations. 6 Many 
interpreted ethnic relations in terms of Soviet federal structure and initially did not pay 
much attention to the genuine ethnic content in these processes. Therefore, the surge 
of ethno-nationalism in the USSR was quite unexpected and no effective explanations 
were suggested. The common interpretation was liberalization--protest against the 
Center's political or economic oppression or the consequences of economic 
deprivation and cultural differences, inequalities (e.g., Motyl, 1992; Vetik, 1993) and 
suppressed historical memories and political inequalities (Gurr, 1994). However, 
empirical data do not always support claims about the importance of economic 
inequalities, which presumably produced anti-Russian or 'anti-other ethnic group' 
moods. 
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The poorest republics as a rule did not press for independence. 8 
When central Soviet authority collapsed following the aborted anti-Gorbachev 
coup attempt of August 1991, union republics became independent from Moscow de 
jure, while de facto, many already achieved control of their own affairs. The internal 
administrative borders of the former Soviet Union republics became international 
borders overnight, and ethnic identity (which in some cases was created by purely 
political decisions) became a strong political factor in the newly independent states. 
These developments sent a shock wave among millions of ethnic Russians 
living outside of Russia in non-Russian republics. Overnight, they ceased to be a 
powerful majority of the Soviet superpower and became minorities, often with no 
guarantees of their status. During Soviet times Moscow's interference equalized the 
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demands from ethnic groups within republics toward each other on behalf of one or 
another side. The sudden disappearance of an independent "judge" created 
overwhelming advantages for the titular-majority group. Lack of institutional 
mechanisms for power-sharing, which in Soviet times were arbitrary, and the 
overwhelming concentration of power within the executive branch created few 
opportunities for minority groups to realize their demands. The titular ethnic groups' 
perception was that now they "finally" were in control of their fate , while minorities 
( especially ethnic Russians) felt they were not part of the political process (Tishkov, 
1995).9 
Indeed, the language, citizenship, elections, and other laws adopted in many 
Newly Independent States (NIS) even before the de facto disintegration of the USSR, 
might have effectively "squeezed-out" many competitors (members of non-titular 
ethnic groups) from important positions. Language laws severely reduced employment 
opportunities for those who did not speak the titular language well enough. Since 
Russian was widely used in the Soviet Union as a language of inter-ethnic 
communication, many non-titulars had neither the need, desire, nor simple opportunity 
to study the titular language. Any of these could cause them to lose their positions to 
competitors from the titular ethnic group . 
Table 2 provides approximate rankings of the levels of conflict between 
majority ethnic groups and the Russian ethnic minority ( except Russia, where Tatars 
are the minority under consideration) as determined through published accounts, such 
as, Atkin (1993), Bremmer (1994), Fane (1993), Kaiser (1995), Solonar and Bruter 
(1994), Urban and Zaprudnik (1993), the U.S . Department of State Human Rights 
Reports ( 1997), Wixman ( 1993). 
The most severe ethnic conflict between titular majority and ethnic Russians in 
the post-Soviet territory took place in Moldova. Solonar and Bruter ( I 994) argue, for 
example, that after the nationalists gained power in Moldova and made top 
appointments on an ethnic basis, the result was outright ethnic war. In September 
1991, the government leadership was made 92% Moldovan. These authors believe 
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Table 2: Extent of Ethnic Conflicts in the Former Soviet 
Union 
(Based on Atkin (1993 ), Bremmer ( 1994 ), Solonar and Brnter (1994 ), 
Fane (1993), Kaiser (1995), Urban and Zaprndnik (1993), U.S. 
Department of State Human Rights Reports (1997), Wixman ( 1993). 
Country Groups (majority vs. Extent of Conflict 
minority) 
Moldova Moldovans vs. Russians 3 (severe) 
Latvia Latvians vs. Russians 2 (intermediate) 
Tajikistan Tajiks vs. Russians 2 (intermediate) 
Kazakstan Kazaks vs. Russians 2 (intermediate) 
Ukraine Ukrainians vs. Russians 1 (low) 
Kyrgyzstan K yrgyzis vs. Russians 1 (low) 
Russia Russians vs. Tatars 1 (low) 
Georgia Georgians vs. Russians 0 (none) 
Armenia Armenians vs. Russians 0 (none) 
Azerbaijan Azeris vs . Russians 0 (none) 
Belorus Belorusians vs. Russians 0 (none) 
that " ... the interethnic conflict first turned into a territorial and then an interstate 
conflict,which later assumed the form of military confrontation"(pp. 84, 88). This 
outright military conflict (similar to the Yugoslavian scenario) eventually divided the 
country into two ethnic parts-Moldovan and Russian (Fane, 1993, pp.139-141 ). Thus, 
the Moldovan case is rated 3, indicating the highest level of ethnic confrontation. 
While Latvia managed to escape military conflict over the same issues, the 
situation with ethnic Russians remained quite tense. This confrontation, which started 
with a forceful introduction of Latvian language requirements in the early 1990s, is 
ongoing and has led to numerous protests. Importantly, citizenship laws have left 
many ethnic Russian residents of Latvia without Latvian citizenship; as a result, they 
do not participate fully in civic life (U.S. Department of State Human Rights Reports 
for Latvia, 1997). Kaiser ( 1995) argues that, "in Latvia ... restrictive citizenship laws 
are used to restrict non-titular access to jobs" (p . l 04) and "in the Baltic states, where 
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nationalist elites were successful in gaining political power during the late 1980s, they 
have used this power to pass language laws that undermine the competitive position of 
Russians in favor of the titular nations" (p.105). Thus, the Latvian case is rated 2, 
indicating the strong level of ethnic confrontation, still short of actual military conflict, 
however. 
Among the countries of Central Asia, the Russian minority is experiencing the 
strongest pressures in Kazakstan and Tajikistan. In the first case, the introduction of 
the Kazak language and the policy of parachuting Kazak administrators into Russian-
populated areas of Northern Kazakstan brought wide resentment and some protests. 
Bremmer ( 1994) argues that while "there is general agreement between Kazaks and 
Russians that before the fall of the Soviet Union ethnic tensions were generally 
unknown to northern Kazakstan .. . " : 
.. . a fundamental part of the process of enlarging Kazak presence 
[in majority Russian regions] has been cadre replacement, with the 
objective of creating small but powerful local elites politically loyal 
to the center . .. This has been particularly evident at the top levels, 
where substantial numbers of non-Kazaks in key positions have 
been removed . . . In 1992 alone, Russians holding five of the most 
important positions in the oblast administration of Eastern 
Kazakstan were replaced by Kazaks directly accountable to the 
central government in Alma-Ata (p. 621 ) . 
As the U.S . Department of State has recently reported, the Kazakstan 
government continued to discriminate in favor of ethnic Kazaks in government 
employment, where ethnic Kazaks predominate, as well as in education, housing, and 
other areas. However, it reports that the Kazak government has continued to back 
away from its "Kazakification" campaign of the first year of independence (U.S. 
Department of State Human Rights Reports for Kazakstan, 1997). 
The Kazakstan case is close to the Latvian one and is rated 2, indicating the 
strong level of ethnic confrontation, again short of actual military conflict. 
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In Tajikistan, violent military conflicts between rival Tajik clans forced most 
Russians to flee a disintegrating country. (Atkin, 1993, pp. 368-369). The U.S. State 
Department reports that while the government has repeatedly expressed its desire for 
the ethnic Russian and Slavic populations to remain, economic conditions provide little 
incentive for them to do so, and some local Russians and other Slavs perceive an 
increase in negative social attitudes toward them (U.S. Department of State Human 
Rights Reports for Tajikistan, 1997). The Tajikistan case is different in many instances 
from the others since conflict there took place within the majority group itself. 
However, because of the military conflict in the society and economic discrimination 
against ethnic Russians, this case is rated 2. 
Meanwhile, Kyrgyzstan adopted a relatively soft policy of accommodating 
Russians in the new society, and language requirements there are not so stringent. The 
U.S . State Department reports that while minorities complain of alleged discrimination 
and argue that the government favors ethnic Kyrgyz due to government efforts, 
Russian emigration has significantly declined, with some ethnic Russians returning 
(U.S. Department of State Human Rights Reports for Kyrgyzstan, 1997). Thus, the 
Kyrgyz case is rated 1, indicating a moderate level of ethnic confrontation. 
The Russian minority in Ukraine experienced the discomfort of becoming a 
minority and many experts see the possibility of strong separatist movements in the 
Russian-populated areas under certain circumstances. Kaiser (1995) argues that if in 
the Ukraine " .. . formal Ukrainization of the workforce and society is able to 
dominate the political agenda, a Russian separatism similar to that in Moldova is 
likely"(p. 109). The U.S. State Department reports that ethnic relations in Ukraine are 
quite positive, with only isolated cases of ethnic discrimination in Ukraine. There are, 
however, two important exceptions: in some parts of western Ukraine and in Crimea, 
local ethnic communities credibly complain of discrimination (U.S. Department of 
State Ukraine Country Report on Human Rights Practices, 1997). So, the Ukrainian 
case is rated 1, indicating a moderate level of ethnic confrontation. 
9 
Initially, strong separatist tendencies in the regions of Russia populated by 
Tatars quickly subsided after federal arrangements were negotiated between Moscow 
and the regional government. Still, separatist movements exist among some Tatar 
nationalists (Wixman, 1993, pp. 430-432, 442). Thus, the Russian case is rated 1, 
indicating a moderate level of ethnic confrontation. 
In the other Slavic country of Belarus, there is no indication of majority-
minority conflict at all, with a high level of intermarriage and overall cultural closeness 
(Urban and Zaprudnik, 1993, p.114-115). The rating for the Belarusian case is 0, 
which means no ethnic conflict between the native majority and the ethnic Russian 
minority. 
The countries of the South Caucasus region (Georgia, Azerbaijan, and 
Armenia) have relatively small Russian minorities in their populations. Nationalist 
movements in these countries were rarely directed against local Russians and virtually 
all existing ethnic conflicts involve other local ethnic groups (e.g., Armenian-Azeri 
conflict, Georgian-Abkhaz conflict). Thus, the ratings for these countries are 0, since 
no significant confrontations between majority groups and ethnic Russians are noted 
there. 
Overall, the decrease in minority participation in the political and social 
processes of the NIS and the break-up of implicit power-sharing agreements 
maintained in Soviet times have led to a drastic rise in the minority perception of the 
country government as an agent of the titular ethnic group. Thus, the remnants of the 
Soviet period in that sense represent an "invitation" for ethnic conflicts, and most of 
the social conflicts have ethnic overtones. The political changes in the former Soviet 
Union have had an important impact on population' s ethnic attitudes, with the rise of 
the salience of ethnic identity being the most crucial factor. Increased conflict among 
ethnic groups is largely responsible for the rise of this salience. 
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Theoretical Background 
Ethnic identity and the factors influencing its strength and direction are 
relatively little-studied topics in social psychology. In most studies, after individuals 
are identified as belonging to a particular group, the analytic focus is mostly on inter-
group comparison and the impact of different intervening variables ( especially class 
and education) on ethnic prejudice and stereotyping. Most researchers interested in 
ethnic relations are involved in the analyses of ethnic prejudice, with ethnic identity 
serving as a constant ("Whites," "Blacks," etc.) criterion for inter-group comparison. 
While researchers as a rule acknowledge the complicated nature of ethnic identity and 
its fluidity and change, few undertake empirical studies or suggest theoretical concepts 
that would describe the dynamics of different dimensions of ethnic identity and 
establish the factors and conditions influencing the nature and strength of ethnic 
identity or their effect on ethnic perceptions. The present study will examine these 
factors and their impact on ethnic identity, while adding micro and macro variables 
into the analysis. This research will combine the several theoretical approaches in 
social psychology related to ethnic identity, especially social identity theory and the 
contact hypothesis, each of which has received considerable empirical support. 
Sociological research on inter-group relations dates to the beginning of this 
century and has focused largely on out-group prejudice and stereotyping, paying little 
attention to ethnic identity. Overall, research is concentrated on the idea of inter-group 
attitude comparisons initially developed by Bogardus ( 1926). 10 (See endnote 11 for an 
overview of related research.) 
During the mid- l 960s, however, interest in the study of ethnic relations 
decreased in American sociology, since in the context of modernization, the prevailing 
understanding of ethnic relations was that ethnicity was becoming less important. It 
was thought that ethnic differences were disappearing because minorities, by joining 
the majority culture, would eventually assimilate and ethnic identity would lessen 
considerably. Although the growth in ethnic-related movements and confrontations 
from the 1970s onward increased interest in this subject among social scientists, that 
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interest was in many instances still limited to inter-group comparisons and to studies 
of stereotypes and prejudice, rather than to ethnic identity issues. 
The current research underlines the growing importance of ethnic boundaries 
even in traditionally assimilationist societies (such as the U.S.) . Research pointed out 
at the end of the Cold War as a main reason for ethnic revival, since it freed numerous 
Third World ethnic movements from their ideological component. Another important 
factor was the worldwide decline in religiosity. As a result, ethnicity came to play a 
more important functional role in society, giving individuals a stronger sense of 
belonging. 
While research on such a powerful social factor as ethnic identity would seem 
to be of significant interest to social psychologists, growing fragmentation within the 
social sciences has prevented unification of different theoretical approaches to ethnic 
relations into a more integrated theory. One of the major factors that has hindered the 
development of an integrative theory of ethnic relations is the presence of "research 
enclaves," which are relatively independent and rarely interact (Brewer, 1997). As a 
result, no serious attempts have been attempted to date. 
Brewer (1997) suggests a classification of approaches to social sciences 
research on inter-group relations (Table 3). Brewer argues that research in each of the 
six categories ( as shown in the table) has been highly encapsulated, with little 
interaction with others; the biggest gap probably lies between research on the 
individual and group levels. Even though ethnic identity is a product of micro and 
macro processes, studies of ethnic identity by social psychologists are rather rare. This 
research attempts to fill one of these gaps by bringing together elements of macro and 
micro approaches in research on ethnic identity. 
Ethnic Identity in Sociological Perspective 
Ethnic identity can be defined in a variety of ways, most often as a sense of 
belonging to a particular social group with particular cultural differences. Some extend 
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Table 3: Classification of the Research Traditions in the Study oflnter-group 
Relations 
Level of Analysis 
Individual/Interpersonal 
Processes Group Processes 
Cognition - Stereotyping (Bogardus, 1926) - Social 
Categorization 
- Social Identity 
(Tajfel and 
Turner, 1979) 
Affect - Prejudice/Racism (group norms - Inter-group contact 
Attitudes (Sherif and Sherif, 1953) (Allport, 1954) 
-- Unconscious evaluation 
( authoritarian personality; Adorno, 
et al., 1950) 
Behavior - In-Group favoritism - Institutional racism 
Discrimination - Aversive racism - Collective action 
- Grievances against 
discrimination 
(Gurr, 1994) 
(Adapted from Brewer, 1997.) 
this feeling of continuity with a real or imagined past (which is the most important part 
of any definition) to the "sense of affiliative survival" (De Vos, 1995, p. 25). 
Since ethnic identity is one of the sources of general social identity, the 
theoretical approaches to social identity are quite helpful in considerations of the 
ethnicity paradigm. Indeed, many social factors influencing social identity have an 
important impact in formation and development of ethnic identity, and are important 
elements in the processes used by people to develop perceptions of others. 
In the sociological perspective, individual "identity" would mean a specific 
position or location of the individual on a social continuum. Identification is always a 
relative and complex phenomenon. Higher identification of the individual with a 
particular social element (e.g., nation) means higher salience of this element, which 
may occur for a variety of reasons. Still other components of personal identity are not 
ignored and continue to be present, although their importance may be less significant. 
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While personal identity is comprised of a complex set of attributes unique to 
the individual, social identity is a complex of attributes unique to the members of the 
group, which may be defined in a variety of meaningful ways . It is commonly defined 
as a position of one social group in relation to other social groups in a social 
continuum. This position defines the salience of the different components of social 
identity (Berger, 1966; Berger and Luckman, 1967). 
One argument for the importance of social identity compared with personal 
identity in inter-group relations was presented by Smith ( 1993), who argues that: 
. . attitudes and behaviors relevant to inter-group relations are 
driven by feelings and cognitions that reference the perceiver's 
social rather than individual or personal identity ... And fraternal 
relative deprivation [feelings that one's group is not faring as well 
as it deserves or as well as a comparison group] clearly implicates 
feelings of resentment or inequity felt on behalf of one's social 
identity as a group member (p. 308). 
Social identity, meanwhile, is closely connected with personal identity, since it 
becomes a part of it. Indeed, as Ross and Ross ( 1995) argue, 
To be subjectively genuine, changes in identity must start 
sufficiently early to make the assumption of a particular behavior 
feel internally natural to the individual. A sense of identity is, by 
definition and by implication, a conscious part of the self rather that 
the operation of unperceived automatic mechanisms. It is a 
conscious awareness of what and who one is in relation to a social 
group. An ethnic identity is developed through time and takes on 
various meanings in the course of one's life experience, as one 
contrasts one's social group in some measure against the dominant 
culture and against other groups within it (p .367). 
A widely held approach ( and one actively exploited in politics) largely presupposes 
that ethnicity is a primordial phenomenon held from ancient times . In this perspective, 
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ethnic identity is considered a mystic bond that connects generations of people, gives 
them a common past and suggests a common destiny. Ethnic identity then is 
considered an unchangeable defining element of the personality, attached to 
individuals for as long as they live. As Smith ( 1991) argues, "identification with the 
' nation' in a secular era is the surest way to surmount the finality of death and ensure a 
measure of personal immortality. Even the Party cannot make so unequivocal a 
promise; it too must ultimately fall back on the nation" (pp.160-161 ). 
Most social scientists view biological determinism in ethnic identity with 
skepticism, and instead beleiving ethnic identity to be a socially constructed situational 
and changing phenomenon. Since ethnicity often depends on stable social, cultural, 
and economic structures in society, some scholars believe that once constructed, 
ethnicity changes only slowly (Eriksen, 1993). 
An impo1tant characteristic in the process of ethnic identity formation is the 
division between "we" and "they." Indeed, if individuals identify themselves with a 
particular social group within the social system, they would perceive the distinctions 
between this group and other groups. The higher level of identification would lead to 
the further distancing of"we" from "them," who will be perceived as more different. 
As Salamone (1986) argues, "there is no "us" without "them" (p. 61 ). Meanwhile, the 
"them" element in social identity is often ignored in research, while the "we" part of 
ethnic identity is overemphasized. 
Reflecting this perspective, Nagel (1994) argues that, 
As the individual ( or group) moves through daily life, ethnicity can 
change according to variation in the situations and audiences 
encountered. Ethnic identity, then, is a dialectical process, as well 
as the individual's self identification and outsiders' ethnic 
designations - i.e. what you think your ethnicity is, versus what they 
think your ethnicity is. Since ethnicity changes situationally, the 
individual carries a portfolio of ethnic identities that are more or 
less salient in various situations and vis-a-vis various audiences 
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(p.155). 
Indeed, the same person may be identified as "White" in the US, "Turk" in Germany, 
"Moslem" in Israel, "European" in China, and "Anatolian" in Turkey. 
Each of these definitions brings a whole "package" of expectations and 
behavioral scripts that could force a person to behave within limits imposed by such 
definitions. Tajfel (I 978) described the experience of West Indian students in Britain 
who were perceived by Britons as "Blacks," with no attention paid to their self-
perceptions. After this environmental reaction, the students did develop "Black 
consciousness," which they had not previously had (pp.6-7) . 
One of the important features of current ethnic identity research is that while 
many studies pay lip service to the fluidity and complexity of identity, they 
nevertheless focus overwhelmingly on ethnic boundary characteristics and their 
historical background. Overall, the ethnic boundaries and specific characteristics that 
underlie ethnic distinctions have become a favorite area of research in the field of 
ethnic relations . Often, researchers literally vilify the objective insignificance of these 
characteristics for the outside observer. 
Thus, according to M. Seeman (1990) : 
Because any observable difference ( of speech, dress, appearance, 
behavior, and so forth) between people can become the basis for 
such categorical discrimination (that is, differential treatment based 
upon irrelevant categorical features), it is in some degree an 
"accident" of history that ethnic, religious, and natural categories 
have constituted the classic minorities (p . 379). 
In a similar way, De Vos (1995) argues that 
. .. group identity can even be maintained by minor differences in 
linguistic patterns and by styles of gestures. There are many ways in 
which language patterning fluency or lack of fluency in a second 
language is related to identity maintenance. (p. 23) . . . An origin 
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myth can be created to justify a contemporary political loyalty or 
new sense of contrasting status enhancing identity (p. 24). 
Nagel (1994) cites many examples of the creation of ethnic attributes, from initially 
"artificial" constructs to important factors of real-life society: these include the distinct 
Hiohlanders' culture of Scotland, American-Indian cultural forms and the invention of 
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the Kwanzaa holiday in the US African-American community (pp. 164-165). 
However, Allahar (1994) argues that while socially constructed ethnic identity 
may or may not be primordial or based on wrong cultural/historical assumptions the 
uncertainty will not prevent people from believing their ethnic attachments are 
primordial. This primoridiality indeed becomes real in its consequences. When an 
ethnic identity becomes a part of one's self-concept-attached to the subjective belief 
that the self belongs to a group with which it shares a common fate--attitudes toward 
in- and out-group members will then be derived from that ethnic self-concept, even if 
based on incorrect historical/cultural assumptions. 
While non-sociologists may see the process of creating a social identity on the 
basis of "artificial" criteria as an amusing and strange phenomenon, it is a well-
established argument in social psychology. In fact, the theoretical importance of even 
trivial criteria for group boundary formation is one of the issues that has dominated 
studies of identity in social psychology since the late 1960s, especially as developed in 
the social identity theory of Tajfel and Turner ( 1979). This approach is probably the 
best developed (theoretically and empirically) and tested theory on identity in a field 
mostly concerned with interpersonal processes and boundary emergence in groups. 
One of the major findings of the research conducted within this paradigm is 
that people understand their social world in categories; therefore, the categorization of 
people into groups is an inevitable result of human comprehension of social reality. 
Social identity was defined "as that part of an individual's self-concept which derives 
from his knowledge of his membership of a social group ( or groups) together with the 
value and emotional significance attached to that membership" (Tajfel, 1978, p. 63). 
Social identity (and therefore ethnic identity) in this perspective is closely connected 
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with memberships in different groups and thus has direct consequences for inter-group 
behavior. The major premise of social identity theory, then, is that outside groups will 
always be considered more negatively than one's own groups.12 
Since individuals will tend to have positive self-concepts and will try to 
maintain their self-esteem, and since part of their self-concept is defined in terms of 
group affiliation, an individual will tend to view in-groups favorably in comparison 
with out-groups. Subsequently, according to this theory, people derive their identity 
from group membership, such that the members of ethnic groups would tend to carry 
negative attitudes toward all other ethnic out-groups. 
Tajfel ( 1978) argues that as social relations become "group relations," they 
first will be "to a large extent independent of individual differences, either in the in-
group or in the out-group. Second, it will be, to a large extent, independent of the 
personal relationships which may exist in other situations between individual members 
of the two groups" (p. 44). Tajfel further argues that, "some social situations will 
force most individuals involved, however weak and unimportant to them may their 
initial group identification have been, to act in terms of their group membership ... and 
enhance for many people the significance to them of the initially weak forms of their 
group membership" (p. 39). 
Tajfel' s classic experiments (Tajfel, 1978) have demonstrated how easily group 
boundary formation can occur, even in the case of insignificant or trivial criteria for 
group formation . He assumes that after this "differentiator" started to work, " ... the 
subjects structured the situation for themselves as one involving relations between 
groups, and that they behaved in ways similar to those habitual to them in situations of 
this kind" (p. 36). 
However, since group boundary formation is Tajfel's main interest, the 
"external differentiator" (or social element) rule has been trivial (for example, color 
preferences). Also, as a rule only one element has been used for the role of 
differentiator. While this oversimplification of social reality is indeed important to the 
"cleanliness" of the experiment, the inevitable consequence is that only one dimension 
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of the subject's identity is considered. Other limitations include the fact that 
differences between strong and weak identifiers are ignored, and that no comparison 
of the effect of different components of identities on out-groups' attitudes is 
conducted. It remains unclear whether out-group perception varies among strong and 
weak identifiers and what elements of identity have the strongest effect on out-group 
perception. 
Another relevant approach is the "contact hypothesis," which states that the 
consequence of inter-group contacts will be favorable when participants are of the 
same social status and are seeking collective goals. It was developed by Allport 
(1954), who based hi s theory on individual motivation, stating that "one of the 
frequent sources, perhaps the most frequent source, of prejudice .'lies in the needs and 
habits that reflect the influence of in-group memberships upon the development of the 
individual personality"(µ . 84). 
The contact hypothesis was one of the most notable ideas developed by social 
psychologists. It was presented as an argument against racial segregation during the 
US Supreme Court's consideration of the Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka 
case in 1954. Strongly supported by empirical data, the contact hypothesis, combined 
with some of the elements of social identity theory, has been elaborated into an 
integrative theory of inter-group prejudice and conflict (Miller and Brewer, 1984). 
The basic postulates of this approaches are that: 
l. assimilation occurs within category boundaries and contrast between 
categories, such that all members of the in-group are perceived to be more 
similar to the self than members of the out-group (the inter-group 
accentuation principle); 
2. positive affect (trust, liking) is selectively generalized to fellow in-group 
members but not out-group members (the in-group favoritism principle); 
and 
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3. inter-group social comparison is associated with perceived negative 
interdependence between in-group and out-group (the social competition 
principle) (Brewer, 1997). 
Overall, this theoretical approach predicts that in interethnic relations, in-group 
members will be treated more positively and less trust will be given to out-group 
members. 
While the contact hypothesis was eventually curtailed by necessary 
qualifications ( equal status, positive affect, etc.), it remains the most theoretically and 
methodologically strong approach to inter-group relations. However, its major 
weakness (as with other individualistic theories of ethnicity) is its concentration more 
on personal identity or role identity, ignoring the social origins of ethnic attitudes and 
ethnic identity. 
In their turn, macro-level theories do not pay much attention to individualistic 
processes. However, macro-level sociologist James Coleman (1957) initially 
underlined the importance of different levels of strength of social identity, arguing that 
the process of social identification leads persons 
... to identify with groups of which they are members . . . If the 
strength of this identification is great, it leads the individual to take 
the organization's position, to accept its reasons and use them as 
his own .. . All individuals are equipped with a multitude of ties, 
any of which may be sufficient to pull him into a controversy. If 
these ties all go to persons and groups on one side, they will all pull 
in the same direction, and bring him quickly into the controversy; if 
they opposite one another, he may be 'cross-pressured,' and 
perhaps withdraw from the controversy (p.18). 
By contrast, researchers working at the macro-level (behavior/collective 
action) have paid most attention to economic and political inequalities at the 
institutional level, and to historic memories of lost autonomy and repression, as the 
most important factors in ethnic relations (Gurr, 1993). There are few arguments 
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against the importance of these structural factors, even if some of the macro-level 
models, which consider economic or political inequality a general major driving force 
for ethnic conflicts can be challenged. As Gurr (1993) maintains, among thirty-two 
politicized minorities of Eastern Europe and the USSR prior to the demise of 
communism, very few "experienced deliberate economic discrimination or political 
discrimination" (p. 61 ). This region currently experiences a number of ethnic conflicts. 
An important theoretical approach at the macrolevel is the human needs model 
of Azar ( 1990) and Burton and Dukes (1990), which asserts that the basis for ethnic 
conflict is the shortage of "basic human needs" for members of a particular ethnic 
group. According to this model, ethnicity is always coherent, the struggle for identity 
is permanent, and such conflicts inevitably become ethnic in nature and are often 
protracted. 
In an approach that emphasizes situational factors, Gurr and Harff ( 1994) 
argue that: 
... when people with a shared ethnic identity are discriminated 
against, they are likely to be resentful and angry .. . A major 
determinant of the occurrence of ethno-political conflict is the 
cohesion of the challenging ethnic group (p. 84). 
In macro-level theories of ethnic relations, conflict is commonly viewed as an 
important consequence of highly salient ethnic identity or even as a direct result of it. 
Here lies the famous "historical memories" approach to ethnic conflict, which explains 
most of the current such conflicts as a result of century-old feuds between rival 
groups. However, researchers have found contradictory empirical evidence for this 
claim. 
Indeed, ethnic relations between currently warring groups have often been 
quite tolerant prior to the start of the hostilities. Moreover, these groups' ethnic 
identity may not have been very salient before open conflict began (Hudson, Sekulic 
and Massey, 1994; Yamskov, 1991). Thus, in pre-war Yugoslavia, as Gilliland (1995) 
argues, 
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. .. other dimensions of personal and group identities took 
precedence over ethno-nationality, at least in some parts of the 
south Slav regions. Ethno-nationality, as one dimension of identity, 
did not disappear, but for some, perhaps many southern Slavs, it 
ceased to make sense to define oneself or others primarily in such 
terms. In the current war, political leaders and other elites have 
used ethnic nationality to gain backing for political agendas that 
may not have been primarily motivated by nationalism itself (p. 
212). 
Initially, clashes in Uzbekistan's Andizhan region between ethnic Uzbeks and 
Kyrgyzs have little ethnic content at all. Gleason (1993) pointed out that members of 
these two ethnic groups are not "physically distinguishable from one another and 
spoke languages that were closely related, [so] many of the rioting youths donned red 
or black armbands to distinguish their side from the others side" (p. 333). 
Often, only one party to the conflict has a strong ethnic identity, while its 
ethnicity has not been salient prior to confrontation. For example, Saroyan ( 1997) 
argues that the conflict with Armenia and Armenian nationalism strengthened Azeri 
ethnic identity in late 1980s. He quotes an Azeri journalist who said that: 
We had a weak sense of solidarity in the past and minded our own 
business. The developments [ of the conflict] have helped to unite 
us. A national feeling and state of awareness have emerged in the 
community for the first time. We had not observed it in the past. I 
can say that Azerbaijan has changed. It is as if the Armenian 
attitude has awakened the people and moved them to safeguard 
their rights (p. 181). 
Imp01tantly, some researchers have concluded that latent ethnic boundaries 
always existed, and under conditions of conflict ethnic divisions would inevitably 



















The importance of conflict in strengthening ethnic identity may be confirmed 
by another example from Yugoslavia's break-up. As Sukic (1996) argues, " .... because 
the language spoken in Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina was a 
single one, the new nation-states had to enforce language fragmentation along ethnic 
lines by promoting new language identities" (p. 10). Bosnian Serbs tried to cleanse 
their language of Turkish and "Croatian" words, Bosnian Moslems introduced Arabic 
words, while Croats followed suit by enforcing Latin script. 
Thus, the mechanisms of ethnic conflict can be quite different from classic 
"historic memories." What later becomes a serious protracted ethnic conflict may start 
as a rather political/economic/communal confrontation, with little ethnic content on 
either side. Conflict itself produces ethnic overtones and finally creates strong ethnic 
identity, even if initially a trivial factor. Moreover, whatever the initial conditions, the 
conflict may lead to a situation in which communities of peoples ( even with rather 
blurred borders) may become separate ethnicities with different languages. 
The importance of macro-level factors for individual-level psychological 
processes also may be considered from a different angle, by looking at the effects of 
population distribution. Blau (1994) underlined the importance of heterogeneity for 
social processes, arguing that structural conditions make some sort of inter-group 
relations simply impossible. As Blau argues, " .. . the greater the heterogeneity, the 
greater are the chances that fortuitous encounters involve members of different 
groups" (p. 31 ). 
The result of these encounters may differ, thus making heterogeneity a 
contradictory factor. On the one hand, the physical absence of an out-group makes 
inter-group conflict impossible, while a minority' s presence creates a structural 
possibility of conflict. Indeed, the absence of Jews in a particular country makes anti-
Semitism impossible, since there is no target for attacks. On the other hand, structural 
conditions can create an environment for positive inter-group relations--the presence 
of a minority group may make interracial marriage and friendship possible. (A White 
person cannot have a Black friend, if there are no Blacks in the community.) 
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While one of Blau's (1994, p. 40) original theses is that heterogeneity 
increases the rate of inter-group conflict (since conflict requires a direct contact), 
another states that heterogeneity promotes inter-group relations (p. 36). The outcome 
of the pai1icular level of heterogeneity on inter-group relations is, then, the product of 
intervening variables (such as mobility and inequality in the Blau's model). Still, Blau 
argues that the different levels of heterogeneity have different effects on inter-group 
relations. Basing his argument on a major empirical study, he stipulates that for 
positive ethnic relations micro-heterogeneity is more important than macro-
heterogeneity. His proposition that" ... ethnic heterogeneity raises the rate of 
interethnic friendships substantially more if it penetrates into classrooms than if it is 
confined to the higher level of the school system" (Blau, 1994, p.77) is very relevant 
for the present research, and in fact will be confirmed in the analysis in chapter 3. 
While ethnic self-identification has been widely used in sociological research, it 
has some serious limitations because it describes only one part of ethnic identity. For 
example, an otherwise strong ethnic identifier (say, Russian) may not indicate a high 
level of prejudice toward a group for which a significant distance is not felt (such as 
Ukrainians). This situation would confuse researchers working in the "standard" 
paradigm, who might expect strong ethnic identifiers would have negative feelings 
toward all out-groups in accordance with social identity theory. Indeed, the latter 
postulates that social identification always presupposes boundary formation. This 
research treats social identification as a distancing in relation to different groups on 
different levels, with borderlines sometimes being rather blurred or sometimes 
extremely salient. 
Ethnic distinctiveness is thus considered a result of several micro-factors: self-
identification, parents' identification, language, ethnic heterogeneity at the school 
level; one can look as well to macro-factors--ethnic heterogeneity at the regional and 
country levels, and the intensity of ethnic conflict in society. 
The line of argument behind this research is as follows . Since ethnic identity 
has not been a major factor in social processes in the USSR prior to Gorbachev 
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reforms, ethnic boundaries blurred and ethnicity was not salient. The ethnic structuring 
of the Soviet Union by the communist authorities can be considered the real-world 
counterpart of the "external differentiator" in Tajfel's experiments. When post-Soviet 
societies became fully independent and more ethnically-structured countries, social 
tensions often were perceived as ethnic ones; therefore, some social and political 
events (government actions, media reports, etc.) became interpreted by individuals as 
a threat to the welfare of their ethnic group. 
These processes have led to a rise in the salience of ethnic identity, with an 
increasing formation of boundaries. While in general the processes have been quite 
similar among all post-Soviet societies, the occurrence of an open ethnic conflict in 
some of them has caused an made especially pronounced distancing from the opposite 
groups, acting as a an intervening factor. Another important factor here is ethnic 
heterogeneity, which plays a somewhat different role on different societal levels: while 
on the micro-level its effects on inter-ethnic relations have been positive, on the 
macro-level it has either been negative or positive, since it has involved different 
mechanisms and created structural conditions for conflict interactions. 
Thus, analysis of the effects of ethnic conflict and the population's ethnic 
homogeneity on ethnic identity is important feature in this research. It allows an 
analysis and comparison of the little-studied effect of the social system on ethnic 
identity processes. The continuous nature of the ethnic distinctiveness variable allows 
detailed study of the effect of the different components and the factors influencing 
students ' ethnic identity, including conflict, ethnic self-identification, parents' ethnic 
identity, ethnic language, level of interaction with outsiders level of ethnic 
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homogeneity at both the macro- and micro-levels, parents ' education, religious 
strength, gender, and family income. 
In this research, the following questions are addressed, with specific research 
hypotheses elaborated later (seep. 39) : 
What impact does the ethnic homogeneity of the population have on ethnic 
identity? 
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How does inter-group conflict influence perceptions of being different from 
other ethnic groups? 
What is the relative strength of one element of ethnic identity versus others? 
What role does parents' ethnic identification play in ethnic self-identification? 
How do the different elements of ethnic identity influence perceptions of being 
different from other ethnic groups? 
In which countries does the suggested model work better than others and what 
intervening variables may influence it? 
This study is purposely limited in scope to analyses of the direct effect of the 
above- mentioned variables on ethnic distinctiveness, leaving more complex combined 
and interaction effects to be examined in future research. 
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CHAPTER2 
METHODS, CONCEPTS, AND MEASUREMENT 
The data for this analysis were collected from students in their final years of 
high school in the former USSR, using probability sampling procedures. Data were 
collected in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, Belorus, Russia, 
Kazakstan, Latvia, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan from May 1993 to May 1995 . The 
surveys were mainly conducted through the Institute of Comparative Social Studies 
Russian Academy of Sciences, and the Sociology Department, Moscow State 
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University, and its Survey Research Center. Both collected complete listings of high 
schools in the countries. Schools were selected at random from official records of the 
numbers of schools. 
The probability samples in each country consisted of students in both the 9th 
and l 1th (graduating) years of secondary school. All students in the 9th and 11 th 
grades in the selected schools were included in the sample. Exact context or time of 
administration (e.g., in social studies classes, after school) was determined on site as 
appropriate to the school. Native university students were hired to explain, conduct, 
and monitor the surveys. All schools were enumerated in each of five selected regions 
within respective countries; eight schools were chosen using systematic random 
sampling procedures. 13 
The interviewers in each selected region started at the first school and then 
went to the second and so on until 200 questionnaires had been completed. However, 
once a school has been selected, all students in the 9th and 11th grades in that school 
completed questionnaires. Thus, the exact number of respondents in each country 
varies slightly. In Russia and Ukraine, the sample sites were doubled to 2,000 to take 
into account the larger populations in these countries. 
Since the samples represent only one age group (14 to 17-year-old high-school 
students), the generalizability of the results is limited to that age group and not to the 
entire population. At the same time, this method of sampling has many advantages. 
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First, there was a common population group in each republic to compare. Thus, the 
factor of age is in a sense "controlled." Second, this age group is relatively pristine in 
the sense that it is least likely to have been subject to historical events and life 
experiences that can differentially affect the perceptions being studied here. Third, this 
group will comprise the next generation of adults in these states, as well as the group 
that will be primarily called on to defend or act on behalf of that state should armed 
forces be necessary. 
It is further the case that this method of sampling (i.e., through the schools) 
provides a sampling frame that comprises a solid, scientific base for ensuring that all 
students have an equal or known chance of selection. This is far more difficult to 
achieve through household samples because of the incomplete and often obsolete lists 
of people in the former Soviet Union, the problem of respondent selection in 
communal housing situations, and the difficulties in achieving uniform interviewing 
procedures. Moreover, because of the willing cooperation and clear hierarchy among 
school officials, it became possible to achieve quite a high response rate ( well above 
90%) among those students selected in the samples, with the main source of non-
response being the non-inclusion of students who did not happen to attend school on 
the day the surveys were conducted (no advanced warning was given to the students, 
so having to complete the surveys was not a reason for not being in school that day) . 
Nonetheless, some proportion of that age cohort was left out of the sample: 
potential respondents who were sick or absent from school on the date of data 
collection, and dropouts. However, no significant difference was found after a 
comparison of sample distribution by demographic and ethnic composition with census 
data. This probably means that the dropout rate is low or random with respect to 
ethnicity. It indirectly reflects the representativiness of the sample procedures used in 
this research. 
A further advantage of this sampling method is that it achieves a high degree of 
uniformity of survey administration across schools and republics. Usually in each 
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out the questionnaires in their classrooms. A trained survey administrator gave an 
introduction to the survey and how it was to be filled out ( deliberately not mentioning 
that it was part of a U.S. venture, to avoid biasing responses set among the 
pm1icipating students). 
Students were then asked to complete the survey in the privacy of their own 
desk with the administrator present to answer questions. Written uniform instructions 
also were provided on the cover page of the questionnaire; these further indicated the 
anonymity and confidentiality of the students' responses. 
In each republic, the survey questions were translated and back translated into 
.,. 
the native language. The survey administrators were of the same nationality as most of 
the students to whom they administered the questionnaire. If Russian students in that 
republic were selected into the sample, administrators gave a form in Russian to them. 
During the collection of the original data, the survey administrators used anonymous 
questionnaires, making it impossible to identify respondents. When students in the 
room had completed the forms, they put them face down on the desk of the survey 
administrator (much as they would in a written test) in order to maintain anonymity. 
Such data collection method utilized in a group-setting environment also can 
be questioned on the basis of its ability to eventually distort responses toward more 
socially desirable ones. In order to prevent this from happening, a neutral 
administrator was present, supervising the procedure and preventing discussion of 
questions. Unfortunately, the original data set did not include social desirability scales, 
which could help control for any distortions. 
To enhance generalizability and scientific confidence in such data collections, 
the 1991- 1992 Russian surveys were designed around a methodological experiment to 
test whether two different research organizations, using independent national 
probability samples, would arrive at consistent estimates and conclusions. One 
Russian sample was interviewed by the Institute of Social and Political Research at the 
Russian Academy of Sciences in December and January 1991-1992 (n=4,213 students 
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Sociology at Moscow State University in February and March 1992 (n=l,950 such 
students). The results from the two surveys were within sampling error of each other 
for about 150 of the 170 common items. Differences for some of the remaining 20 
items could be attributed to different translations. These results help establish this 
sampling approach in the (former) Soviet Union as a model for standard probability 
sample data collection among school-age youth. 
While survey methods can be used in effective evaluation of ethnic relations in 
a society since they describe the attitudes of the general population, few researchers 
have used survey data in ethnic studies in non-Western countries and most studies are 
based on theoretical assumptions rather than on statistical data. This is especially true 
for studies in countries of the former communist bloc. Moreover, of those public 
opinion samples conducted in the former Soviet Union, few have been based on a solid 
probability basis. In the past, both Soviet researchers and interviewers were more 
comfortable with quota selection procedures that had introduced arbitrary selection 
criteria for respondents that had made such procedures suspect in the West. Even 
now, those administering household surveys of adults encounter sampling difficulties 
in terms of complete lists, area coverage on a true probability basis, interviewer 
training, and field quality control. 
Unlike those studies, the universe of school-age children can be well covered 
because these youth are in school, there are complete lists of schools, and school 
officials have been almost universally cooperative in providing access to students in 
their schools. The opportunity to administer questionnaires to groups of students 
simultanously in the school setting means considerable cost savings over individual 
interviews, and ensures standardized administration of questions. Previous research in 
the region (Robinson et al ., 1992, 1993) indicates that interviewing was easily done in 
the school setting when a trained and neutral administrator was present, and that 
school officials were interested in participating and helpful (with less than 5% overall 
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The results in Table 4 show the actual sample distribution in each country, with 
the majority being the titular nation (Ukranians in Ukraine, etc.) and minority being 
ethnic Russians in all countries, except Russia, where Tatars are the main minority. 
The sample ethnic distribution is close to the census data in Table 2. The differences 
are probably due to the population shifts, especially the emigration of ethnic Russians 
from Central Asia. 
Conceptualization 
The key theoretical concepts in the proposed research are Ethnic 
Identification, Ethnic Distinctiveness, Parent's Ethnic Identification, Extent of Out-
group Contact, Level of Interactions with Ethnic Groups, Ethnic Conflict, Ethnic 
Homogeneity, Parents' Education, Language, Religion, Gender, and Income. 
The two largest ethnic groups in each former Soviet republic are selected as a 
majority and a minority. The majority group is sometimes called "a titular group"(i.e. 
Ukrainians in Ukraine), while the minority is usually Russians. In each country, the 
opposite group means the majority from the point of view of the minority and vice 
versa. Exact measurement details are shown in the Appendix. 
Table 4: Sample Ethnic Distribution 
Country Respondent ethnicity Total 
Majority Minority Others 
N <yo N % N % N 
Russia 1993 1,993 87 135 6 150 7 2.278 
Ukraine 1995 1,731 85 273 13 4 2 2,008 
Belarus 1993 836 84 116 12 4 5 956 
Moldova 1994 660 66 135 14 200 20 995 
Georgia 1995 849 83 4 5 126 12 979 
Armenia 1995 1,012 100 0 0 l 0 1,013 
Azerbaijan 1995 943 98 15 2 l 0 959 
Latvia 1996 293 58 163 33 4 9 460 
Kazakstan 1995 550 56 297 30 135 14 982 
Tajikistan 1995 705 71 2 2 266 27 973 
Kyrgyzstan 1995 607 64 154 16 186 20 947 
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Dependent Variable 
The main dependent variable for this research is ethnic distinctiveness--the 
perceived difference in personal characteristics between one's own ethnic group and 
an out-group, usually a minority. As discussed in more detail below and in the 
Appendix, this variable describes the extent to which majority respondents see their 
own ethnic group as different from the ethnic minority. A larger difference reflects a 
larger distance of"we" from "them" along a social continuum. The lack of a difference 
would suggest an absence of boundaries. Pilot studies indicate that the direction of the 
difference is almost always positive (i.e., one's own group is perceived as having more 
positive characteristic). Still, a negative difference would mean a lower evaluation of 
own group, perhaps reflecting self-hatred. 
Independent Variables 
The following variables were used to predict differences in ethnic 
distinctiveness. 
Ethnic identification is a subjective perception of having a common fate with 
members of a specific group; thus, being "Russian" means that respondents consider 
themselves as part of the community of people defined as "Russians," have emotional 
attachments with the historical facts and figures associated with Russian ethnicity, see 
the future of the community as their own, and so on. Of course, the strength of these 
attachments differs across Russian identifiers--they may be exceptionally strong among 
some people and quite weak among others. This reflects the extent to which a person 
values one's ethnicity. The importance of ethnic identity varies across society, being 
stronger among some groups in the population and almost disappearing among others. 
This definition is continuous: different persons can view the importance of ethnicity at 
different levels. 
Parents' ethnic identification is the ethnic identification of the student's 
parents. If one parent is from the majority ethnic group and the other is from other 
(not largest minority) group, it would mean a higher association with the majority 
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group and not with the largest minority group. For example, a person with a Ukrainian 
mother and an Armenian father in Ukraine would feel stronger associations with 
Ukrainians than with Russians, even though his father is a member of a minority group 
and Russians are the largest minority. So, since parents may be of different ethnicities, 
this variable represents the combination of ethnic messages received by the 
respondent. 
Language is the language usually spoken by the respondent. Use of the titular 
language would probably reflect higher ethnic identification with the titular group and 
vice versa. 
Ethnic homogeneity is the proportion of members of the titular ethnic groups 
in the respondent' s proximity, such as classroom or school (first level), within the 
larger region (second level) or within society (third level). A high level of ethnic 
homogeneity presupposes infrequent and indirect contact between the respondent and 
representatives of different ethnic groups. 
Extent of out-group contact indicates the reported level of interaction with 
members of an ethnic group outside one's own. 
Conflict reflects the intensity of ethnic confrontations between majority and 
minority groups, which may involve armed conflict, demonstrations, etc., as described 
in chapter 1, pp. 12-16. 
Control Variables 
The following four variables were used as control variables in many of the 
multivariate analyses. 
Family income is a subjective assessment of income available in the 
respondents' family. A higher level of income is associated with higher tolerance to the 
out-group and therefore with lower ethnic distinctiveness. 
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. Religious strength is the reported strength of the respondent's religious beliefs. 
A h1nher lev I f r . . 0 e o re 1g1ous strength 1s associated with higher ethnic self-identification 
and therefore with lower ethnic distinctiveness. 
Parents' education is the reported highest level of education achieved by the 
respondents ' parents. 
Gender is the self-reported gender of the respondent. 
Processes 
The unit of analysis in the proposed research is the individual. The processes 
described below relate to the individual's social-psychological processes. These 
processes will be considered for all countries in the sample and for each country 
separately. 
Figure I shows a conceptual model of ethnic distinctiveness resulting from 
combined effects of micro and macro factors, such as conflict, ethnic identification 
' 
ethnic homogeneity, and other ethnic variables. Ethnic conflict and homogeneity in a 
society play the roles of moderator variables in increasing the level of ethnic 
distinctiveness. 
According to social identity theory, a perceived threat to ethnic group welfare 
increases ethnocentrism and perceived group differences (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). 
Indeed, perceived threat exacerbates in-group/out-group differences such that out-
group members overestimate the prevalence of negative attributes and underestimate 
the prevalence of positive attributes of the opposite group; conversely, in-group 
members overestimate the prevalence of positive attributes and underestimate the 
prevalence of negative attributes. 
Strong ethnic identifiers with the majority group perceive greater distance from 
the out-groups and vice versa (Tajfel and Turner, 1986). Respondents with parents 
Whose ethnic identification is closer to the majority ethnic group also should develop a , 
higher level of out-group distancing. Closer experience with a member of an out-
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heterogeneity should be associated with lower national distinctiveness. At the same 
time, those respondents with low social status associated with low parental education 
and low income should develop a higher level of out-group prejudice (Adorno et al. 
1950). 
Homogeneity should have certain impacts on respondents. For example, a low 
level of homogeneity on the micro-level should allow close personal contacts between 
groups, since members of both groups belong to the same social and age group. 
According to the contact hypothesis, these factors would lead to a lower level of 
distancing from the outside ethnic group. Indeed, students located in the same high 
school as a rule come from the same neighborhood, and presumably from the same 
social class. They have common goals, there is minimal competition between groups, 
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and contact is sanctioned by the school administration (including the variety of 
extracurricular activities). According to the contact theory, these conditions should 
reduce ethnic divisions (Allport, 1954). At the macro-level, heterogeneity may have 
positive as well as negative effects (Blau, 1994). 
Operationalization 
The measure of ethnic distinctiveness (independent variable) as described in the 
Appendix was developed from six rating scales covering different personal 
characteristics of own ethnic group as opposed to those for the contrasting ethnic 
group ("friendly-unfriendly," "hard working-lazy," "peace loving-aggressive," "open-shy," 
"willing to help others-care only about themselves," "trustworthy-untrustworthy"). 
Perception of the ethnic group as friendly or trustworthy was considered to be a 
product of personal behavioral experience--not necessarily implying direct contacts 
with members of such a group, since such perceptions could result from the mass 
media or peer group information. For the measure of distancing respondents were 
asked to evaluate different characteristics of both the nationality group and the 
contrast group on six 5-point scales, covering relative levels of friendliness, 
trustworthiness, openness, hardworking, and willingness to help others. Where 
necessary, these variables were recoded to assign larger values to the positive 
evaluations [(1=5) (2=4) (3=3) (4=2) (5=1)]. Factor analysis of these variables 
( conducted for the whole sample, both for the contrasting group only and for the majority 
group separately) yielded a single factor. 
Two new variables were created--one by summing the values of variables that 
evaluated the personal characteristics of majority group, and another by summing the values 
of variables that referred to the same characteristic of the minority group. These new 
variables are indicators of positive evaluations of each nationality group. The larger the value 
of the new variable, the larger the positive perception of this ethnic group. 
The difference between these two variables (the first one minus the second one) is 
the overall level of ethnic distinctiveness between opposite ethnic groups. A high level of 
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distinctiveness from the minority for the ethnic majority respondent would then yield a high 
value on this variable. Zero would mean no difference, and therefore no ethnic distinction 
between groups. If a minority respondent's responses produce a high positive score on the 
ethnic distinctiveness variable, the respondent sees the majority nationality as having more 
positive characteristics than the minority. Such a result probably can be interpreted as a 
recognition of the dominant status of the titular nation. 
E2(amQle. For an ethnic Ukrainian respondent in Ukraine who rates Ukrainians as 
very friendly (coded as 5), in large part peace-loving (4), very hardworking (5), in large part 
tmstwo1ihy (4), very much willing to help others (5), and very open (5), the sum of these 
scales produces a combined score of 28. At the same time, if his evaluations of ethnic 
Russians are 3, 4, 2, 4, 3, and 2, correspondingly, this produces a combined score of 18. In 
this example, the ethnic Ukrainian student evaluates his in-group more favorably than ethnic 
Russians. He sees them as less friendly and less open, while at the same time exhibiting the 
same "peace-loving" quality. The difference in the combined evaluation of the ethnic 
Ukrainians vs. ethnic Russians is thus 10 (28 - 18). The larger this score, the more distance 
Ukrainian respondents place between their in-group and the Russian out-group. However, if 
this score would equal 0, for example, then the Ukrainian respondent sees no distance 
between the in-group and out-h>roup. In this case, these groups are seen as one group 
without categorical borders. If this score is negative, then it means this Ukrainian respondent 
perceives his own ethnic group as somewhat inferior to ethnic Russians. 
Overall, this measure shows the absolute value of the gap between perceptions of 
own vs. out-group. It avoids asking a direct question such as, "How do you like this ethnic 
group," which may create difficulties for respondents who may be reluctant to provide 
negative evaluations. On the other hand, this measure works much better than the Bogardus 
social distance scale: our pilot studies show that students had difficulty understanding 
Bogardus scale items. 
Ethnic identification was measured using a combination of two variables: self-
identification and importance of ethnic identity (see Appendix) . Self-identification was 
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case, a denotative definition is used based on how a person is defined via of Census 
Bureau categories. Though some people have difficulty in defining themselves, the 
Soviet system defined their ethnicity quite categorically at the age of 16 (which is the 
age group covered in the sample) . If a respondent's parents were of same ethnicity, the 
child would acquire that ethnicity. If parents were from two different ethnic groups, the 
child would choose between these two ethnicities at the age of 16. The self-reported 
ethnicity was recoded into three categories: O=minority, 1 =others, 2= titular. 
Importance of ethnic identity was measured by asking respondents to describe 
whether their ethnic identity was (1) very important, (2) somewhat important, or (3) not 
important to them. These two variables were combined with strong ethnic identifiers--
the titular group was coded as 7 (the highest score) and strong ethnic identifiers of the 
minority group were coded as O (the lowest score). The scale goes from strong ethnic 
identifi ers of the titular group to the weaker identifiers of the titular group, then to the 
identifiers of the other ethnic groups, to weak minority identifiers and then to the strong 
minority identifiers (see Appendix). 
Parental ethnicity was measured by recoding the open-ended questions, "What 
is your mother' s ethnicity?" and "What is your father' s ethnicity?" into a single 
variable in the following order: if both parents were of the titular ethnic group, the 
variable code was 7; if the father was titular and mother was not titular and not 
minority, then the code was 6; if mother was titular and father was not titular and not 
mi nority, the code was 5; if the father was titular and the mother was minority, then 
the code was 4, if the mother was a titular and father was a minority, the code was 3; 
if the mother was a minority and the father was not a minority and not titular, the code 
was 2; if the father was a minority and the mother was not a minority and not titular, 
the code was l ; and if both parents were minority, the code was 0. All other 
combinations were recoded as 4 (middle of the scale)(see Appendix). 
Language was measured by asking respondents what language they use in 
everyday life. This was recoded into (0) Minority (1) Other, and (2) Titular. Missing 






Extent of out-group contact indicates the general level of interaction with 
members of an ethnic group outside one's own. Respondents were asked to choose 
one of five possible responses: (1) "I interact only within my own ethnic group," (2) 
"I interact mostly within my own ethnic group," (3) "I interact equally with my own 
and other ethnic groups," (4) "I interact mostly with other ethnic groups," and (5) "I 
interact only with other ethnic groups." These responses were treated as equally 
spaced points on a continuous scale, with response ( l) reflecting the lowest level of 
out-group openness and response (5) reflecting the maximum level of openness to out-
groups. ' No answers' were recoded into the middle of the scale (3). 
Ethnic homogeneity on the micro-level was measured at the level of the high 
school . The number of titular students in a particular school was divided by the total 
number of respondents in this school. The resulting variable was recoded into 10 
intervals. A high level of ethnic homogeneity at the micro-level is associated with high 
values for this variable and vice versa. 
Ethnic homogeneity on the regional level was measured at the regional level. 
The number of members of the titular group in a particular region was divided by the 
total population in that region. For larger countries, regions were identified through 
administrative units called ob lasts (the equivalent of states in the US). The resulting 
variable was recoded into 10 intervals. A high level of ethnic homogeneity at the 
region level is presumably associated with the high values of this variable and vice 
versa. 
Ethnic homogeneity at the country level was measured at the country level, 
using census data. 
Conflict was measured on the basis of literature reviews for each country as 
discussed in chapter 1 (pp. 6-10). The scale goes from O (no conflict) to 3 (protracted 
military ethnic conflict). 
Parents' education is based on the highest educational degree received as 
reported by students. The lowest point in the scale is "some secondary-school," the 
highest point is "graduate school degree." 
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Family income was reported as a subjective evaluation of a respondent's 
family's financial standing. The lowest point is "poverty" and the highest is "family has 
unlimited spending potential." While this scale does not measure the actual amount of 
money made by the family (of which respondent may not be aware), it does reflect a 
perception of relative deprivation, which is an important concern for this research. 
Hypotheses 
Basic Hypotheses 
The following basic hypotheses were tested. The degree of ethnic 
distinctiveness was expected to increase as a function of: 
1. Greater extent of in-group contact. A greater extent of in-group contact 
should produce less interaction with the outside group, according to the 
contact hypothesis (Allport, 1954), leading to less positive attitudes toward 
the latter. An integrative theory of inter-group prejudice and conflict 
(Miller and Brewer 1984) also supports this point. 
2. Stronger importance of ethnic identity. This importance leads to stronger 
attachments to the in-group and lower evaluations of the out-group, 
according to Tajfel ( 1978), producing higher ethnic distance between a 
respondent's group and the contrast group. 
3. Higher level of parents' titular identification. A higher level of parents' 
titular identification should produce higher titular identification for the 
student and thus lead to greater distancing from the contrast group, 
following hypothesis 2. 
4. Higher level of titular language identification. More frequent use of the 
majority language means less experience with the minority out-group and 
the creation of negative stereotypes. Respondents with greater 
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ethnic group and should have a less positive out-group experience and 
develop a higher level of out-group distancing. 
5. Higher level of homogeneity at the micro-level. A high level of ethnic 
homogeneity presupposes infrequent and indirect contact between the 
respondent and representatives of different ethnic groups. In this case, 
members of both groups belong to the same social and age group. 
A.ccording to the contact hypothesis, these factors would lead to a low 
level of distancing from the outside ethnic group ( Allport, 1954) 
Conversely, a higher level of ethnic homogeneity would lead to higher level 
of distancing. Blau ( 1994) also stipulates that micro-heterogeneity is more 
important than macro-heterogeneity for positive ethnic relations. Effects of 
the latter may vary from positive to negative depending on the intervening 
variables. 
6. Lower parental education. Many studies have found that a higher 
educational level is associated with more tolerance for minorities. The 
higher educational standing of parents may mediate greater acceptance of 
out-groups among students. Gibson and Duch (1992) argue that education 
works in several ways: by increasing analytical abilities and therefore 
resistance to stereotypes, and by instilling values of equality and tolerance. 
Hamilton et al. (1995) argue that people with higher education and at the 
top of a stratification system hold more autonomous attitudes. These 
findings are consistent with most North American studies, which show that 
education creates individuals with less authoritarianism and more tolerant 
views as in Altemeyer (1988) and Kohn (1990) . 
7. Lower level of family income. It is expected that respondents with low 
social status due to low income will develop a higher level of out-group 
prejudice (Adorno et al., 1950). 
8. Higher levels of inter-group conflict in the society. Higher levels of inter-
group conflict should lead to greater salience of ethnic identity and 
41 
distancing from the other group, since they create a direct or perceived 
threat to ethnic group welfare. According to social identity theory, this 
increases ethnocentrism and perceived group differences (Tajfel and 
Turner, 1979). A perceived threat exacerbates in-group/out-group 
differences in valence inaccuracy such that out-group members 
overestimate the prevalence of negative attributes and underestimate the 
prevalence of positive attributes. In-group members overestimate the 
prevalence of positive attributes and underestimate the prevalence of 




Descriptive Findings on General Inter-Group Perceptions 
Before proceeding to the multivariate analysis of variables in the model, some 
results from ethnicity-related questions will be discussed, mostly using a "like-dislike" 
evaluation of ethnic groups (see Appendix). As Table 5 demonstrates, there are 
significant differences in ethnic attitudes between ethnic minorities and titular ethnic 
respondents and respondents across these countries. 
Titular Ethnic Respondents' Perceptions 
The majority ethnic group respondents evaluate their own ethnic group at a 
very high level: from 97% of Azeris to 85% ofBelorusians said they like or like very 
much their own ethnic group (see Table 5). Their attitudes towards other ethnic 
groups differ somewhat: while titulars generally evaluate ethnic Russians less 
positively than themselves, those numbers range widely--from a high of 90% in 
Tajikistan to a low of 49% in Azerbaijan. Among those ethnically closest to Russians, 
Slavic nations (Ukrainians and Belorusians ), the ratings of Russians are relatively high 
(74% and 80%). Still, these results are not far from those for some Moslem/Turkic 
countries such as Kyrgyzstan (70%). 
This phenomenon is interesting: the positive characteristics of Russians have 
little to do with titular groups' religious affiliations and/or language. As Table 5 
demonstrates, while ratings of ethnic Russians vary across Christian and Moslem 
nationalities, they do not clearly correspond with religious affiliations. Moreover, 
reported attitudes of the titular respondents in general indicate higher positive 
attitudes towards Western/ industrialized nations than toward former Soviet 
"brothers." Indeed, for all countries in the sample, Americans and Italians were among 




Table 5: Ethnic Perceptions of High School Students (% "like" or "like very much") 
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the second most liked group and Americans the third). This holds even for 
conservative Central Asian and Moslem groups, which presumably are more Moslem-
oriented . 
On the other hand, there are many differences at the other end of the scale-
namely, in attitudes toward the least liked groups. In most cases, these are the former 
Soviet groups. In Slavic countries (Russia, Ukraine, Belorus), these peoples are from 
the Caucasus/Central Asia (for example, Azeris, Georgians, Tajiks, and Armenians) . 
The probable reason is these immigrants' involvement in traditionally disliked 
occupations (such as street trade). On the other hand, the least likable ethnic groups in 
Central Asian countries and Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia) are not 
Russians, but some other ethnic groups. 
For example, the least liked group among ethnic Azeris in Azerbaijan is 
Armenians ( 1 %, like) and vice versa (2% ), while ethnic Russians are rated much higher 
( 49% in Azerbaijan said they like Russians, vs. 72% in Armenia) . Undoubtedly, the 
reason for the contrast is the Armenian-Azerbaijan war. At the same time, the attitudes 
of Russians in Russia toward ethnic Azeris and Armenians are quite negative in each 
case: only 15% and 17% of Russian students, respectively, said they like them. 
Thus, attitudes toward Azeris in Russia have very little to do with attitudes 
toward Russians in Azerbaijan since little interaction occurs between these two 
countries. It seems that when asked to evaluate ethnic Russians, majority group 
respondents evaluate local Russians (or perhaps Russian policy toward their country) 
and not ethnic Russians in the far away Russian Federation. 
Ethnic Russian Respondents' Perceptions 
Ethnic Russians in non-Russian countries rate themselves very high (between 
82 and 90 percent say they "like" Russians or "like them very much"). This indicates 







At the same time, their ranking of the majority titular group differs considerably 
across countries. The highest ratings given by ethnic Russians to the titular group was 
in Georgia (91 %) and the lowest in Moldova (34%), where considerable ethnic conflict 
between the titular ethnic group and ethnic Russians broke out in 1991 . 
Table 6 provides a useful comparison of reciprocity between the attitudes of 
titular ethnic groups and ethnic Russians within each country. With the exception of 
Georgia, titular respondents give higher ratings to ethnic Russians than ethnic Russians 
give to them. In other words, Russians express less positive views of the majority 
group. One possible explanation is the Russian's overall dissatisfaction with their 
sudden minority status after the USSR's disintegration and possible distrust of the 
majority group now in contrql. At the same time, titular groups probably do not see 
Russians as a major threat to their dominant status; as a result, they view Russians 
mostly positively. (Georgia, the exception, may be explained by the Russian 
government's support of separatist movements there.) 
The differences between these two ratings are the lowest in Ukraine and 
Belorus (the ethnically closest nations to Russia) and significantly higher in other 
countries where dominant groups differ in ethnic terms. 
Table 6: Comparison of Reciprocal Ratings of Russian and Titular Ethnic Groups 
within each country (% "like" or "like very much") 
,--
Ukraine Belorus Moldova Georgia Kazakst Kyrgyzst Tajikistan 
an an 
Titular 74 80 63 58 68 70 90 
respondents 
who say they 
like Russians 
Russian 59 75 34 91 41 42 48 
respondents 
who say they 
like titulars 
Percent 15 15 29 -33 27 28 42 
Difference 
Note: Armenia, Azerbaijan were not included in this table, due to very small numbers of 
ethnic Russians in the samples. Russia was excluded, since Russians are the titular 
group in that country 
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Institutional Effects on Ethnic Identity Importance 
A comparison of Ukrainian sample results with data taken from earlier 
research by Robinson, Gurr, Kurbanov, McHale, and Slepenkov (1993) indicates that 
for majority and minority groups in that country, attitudinal changes were in large part 
the same across time, indicating overall growth in the significance of ethnicity in social 
life (Table 7). Indeed, while in 1992 just 4 percent of ethnic Russians in Ukraine said 
that ethnic identity was important to them; after three years, this number increased to 
20%. Thus, ethnicity, an almost trivial social factor in 1992, is becoming more and 
more important to the new Russian minority generation in Ukraine. 
Many of the same developments can be seen among Ukrainian youth, with a 
higher level of ethnic awareness: while 24% percent of ethnic Ukrainian respondents 
indicated in 1992 that ethnicity was very important to them, this number increased to 
3 5% in 1995. Moreover, the proportion of ethnic Russians speaking the Ukrainian 
language and ethnic Ukrainians speaking the Russian language slowly decreasing. 
While independence brought more attention to teaching the Ukrainian language, the 
proportion of ethnic Russian respondents speaking only Ukrainian declined to the low 
Table 7: Ethnic Concerns of Students in Ukraine (% agree/completely agree) 
Ukrainians Russians 
1992 1995 1992 1995 
n= (352) (1,723) (100) (271) 
My ethnic identity is very 24 35 4 20 
important to me. 
I speak Ukrainian all the time. 57 62 18 8 
I speak Russian all the time. 45 32 81 89 
I interact only/mostly with my 36 34 18 21 
own ethnic group. 
I interact equally with my own 62 63 77 76 
and other ethnic groups. 
I interact only/mostly with " .) 4 5 3 
other ethnic groups. 
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level of 8%. At the same time, the proportion of ethnic Ukrainians speaking only 
Russian was down from 45% in 1995 to 32% three years later, a significant change in 
the importance of an ethnic language. 
Surprisingly, the level of interethnic contacts remains virtually the same across 
the three-year period. The differences between 1992 and 1995 for both groups is 3 
points or less, indicating a high level of inter-group interaction. The extent of this 
interaction for ethnic Russians is higher than for ethnic Ukrainians, probably because 
of their overall lower numbers in the population. 
Thus, while Ukraine managed to avoid a much feared ethnic confrontation and 
is still considered tolerant, the data indicate growing ethnic concern by ethnic 
Russians perhaps due to their dissatisfaction with this minority status. One possible 
explanation for this change is the significant institutional change that strongly affected 
the social status of ethnic Russians. From being a powerful majority in a superpower 
state, they suddenly became a minority in a poor Eastern European country. 
This institutional change has created a new social environment that emphasizes 
"Ukrainianess." For example, the high school curriculum is different and less Russian-
centered . New history textbooks have been introduced that focus on the history of 
Ukraine and its national heroes. The history of the Soviet people and Russia are no 
longer considered common, but treated as separate phenomena. Historical and current 
events are being interpreted from a Kiev point of view, not Moscow's. State symbols 
are different, while a switch to the majority language is slowly taking place. Thus, a 
new generation of Ukrainian youth is receiving a different societal message that may 
lead to the increased importance of ethnic elements in their social identity. However, 
thi s message has different meaning for majority and minority ethnic groups. 
Still , as Van Knippenberg (1989) argues, " .. . when group boundaries are 
permeable, the dominant strategy of social identity enhancement for low status group 
members is to join higher status groups" (pp. 64-65). This is exactly what happened in 
Ukraine, where some people who declared themselves to be ethnic Russians in Soviet 










report cited in RFE/RL Report, 9/16/97). However, this may occur only among 
people qualified to be so by having a parent who is an ethnic Ukrainian. For others, 
stronger in-group identification will be inevitable (Van Knippenberg, 1989, p. 65). 
Data clearly indicate a rapid growth in the numbers of ethnic Russians emphasizing the 
importance of their ethnic identification. As demonstrated below, these processes are 
further exacerbated in countries with open ethnic conflicts. 
Effect of Macro and Micro Factors on Ethnic Distinctiveness 
Analysis of the impact of the various predictors of ethnic distancing is 
conducted separately for different levels: individual, sub-national, and national. 
Thus, 
1 . Effects of individual-level variables are evaluated by using the analysis of 
variance (ANOV A) multiple classification analysis (MCA) procedure in 
SPSS/PC, which allows effective estimation of the model for individual-
level variables. 
2. Effects of sub-national-level variables (e.g., homogeneity of the school or 
region) are estimated using the relatively new Hierarchical Linear Modeling 
procedure designed specifically for analysis of nested data (Bryk and 
Raudenbush, 1992). The model is run on two levels. The first level 
represents the original individual-level model, and the second level 
describes the effects of school and regional homogeneity. 
3. Effects of national-level factors (e.g. , country homogeneity and ethnic 
conflict) are estimated using the comparative model suggested by Ragin 
(1987). Since the number of cases for the country-level analysis is limited 
( 11 countries), quantitative analysis does not seem appropriate and a rather 
qualitative comparison is used instead; this involves analyzing effects of 
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The following results have been identified and are discussed, using these three 
approaches. 
Analysis Individual-Level Variables 
Analysis at this level involves considerations of the impact of several individual-
level variables on the ethnic distinctiveness variable. The ANOV A-MCA procedure 
used in this analysis allows an efficient analysis of this multiple variable data set. 
Overall, ANOV A performs analysis of variance testing the hypothesis that the group 
means of the dependent variable are equal. Multiple classification analysis creates a 
table that includes a list of unadjusted category effects for each factor, category effects 
adjusted for all factors, and eta and beta correlation values. This facilitates 
interpretation of each factor's role in the model. 
The analysis is conducted for all countries in the sample, with the titular group 
as a majority reference group and ethnic Russians as the minority. In the case of Russia 
( where Russians are the titular group), the Tatars are a minority. As described in more 
detail earlier, ethnic distinctiveness is defined as the sum of the differences in the 
evaluation between the majority ethnic group and the minority ethnic group on six 
personal characteristics. 
Table 8 presents the results of the ANO VA analysis of the total sample and 
shows the significance of the proposed research model with the explained variance 
value (R squared) equal to .17 . All eight variables in the model are significant and 














IDENTITY *** strength of ethnic identity .39 .22 
PARETH** parents' ethnicity .38 .17 
LANGUAGE* * language spoken .29 .07 
INTER ACT** interaction in- and out-group .14 .05 
P AREDUC** parents' education .04 .04 
INCOME* * family income .02 .03 
GENDER* .01 .02 
RELIGION** strernrth of religion .09 .05 
R=.42 R2= .17 
* * significant at <. 01 level * significant at <. 05 level 
Ethnic variables. The results show that respondents ' personal ethnic identity 
has the strongest effect on national distinctiveness, with a beta coefficient of .22. 
Parents' ethnicity has somewhat less effect, with beta of .17, while the other ethnic 
variables (l anguage spoken, interactions within in-group vs. out-group) have a 
considerably less effect, with betas of .07 and .05, respectively. 
While the importance of one ' s personal ethnic identity and one' s parent's 
ethnicity are quite predictable, the weaker effects of reported interaction with outsiders 
and language on ethnic distinctiveness are indeed quite surprising (though they 
significant) . A detailed explanation for these results is provided below, where they are 
compared with the effects of school homogeneity which indicate that intimate 
interactions (such as friendship) may not be a key element in the process of ethnic 
distinctiveness, and that non-intimate interaction (mere observation) - a by-product of 
homogeneity - may have a stronger effect. 
Another important finding is that the control variables (parents' education, 
family income, gender, and strength of religiosity) have little effect on the ethnic 
distinctiveness variable. Moreover, Table 9 shows that while the effect of ethnic 
variables on the predicted mean for the ethnic distinctiveness variable is almost linear, 
thi s is not true for most of the control variables, except for strength of religiosity. 
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Table 9: Individual-level MCA Results 
Predicted Mean of 
Etlmic Distinctivincss 
Etlmic Dictinctiviness by Unadjusted 
Adjusted 
N for Factors 
Ethnic Strong minority identifiers 336 3.24 3.70 
self-identification Medium minority identifiers 533 3.51 3.95 
Weak minority identifiers 478 3.61 4.04 
OU1ers 1,212 3.86 4.12 
Weak majority identifiers 1,706 4.40 4.38 
Medium majority identifiers 3,209 4.56 4.48 
Strong majority identifiers 5,264 4.75 4.63 
Parents' etlmicity Both minority parents 790 3.43 4.00 
Minority mother, other father 360 3.41 3.90 
Minority fati1er, other mother 148 3.46 3.97 
Other combinations 1714 4.04 4.32 
Majority father, oti1er mother 473 4.25 4.25 
Majority mother, oti1er father 971 4.50 4.49 
Both majority parents 8,282 4.68 4.54 
Language mostly Minority lm1guage 3,562 4. 01 4.36 
spoken Other language 782 4.02 4.25 
Majority language 8,394 4.66 4.48 
Interactions with Only with others 112 3.87 3. 97 
in- and out-groups Mostly with others 427 4.23 4.39 I' 
Mame 6,428 4.32 4.43 
Mostly with own 3,500 4.59 4.49 
Only wit11 own 2,271 4.60 4.39 : , 
Parents' Lowest education 1, 124 4.44 4.39 
education 2 2,438 4.45 4.41 
3 4,337 4.43 4.43 
4 1,337 4.32 4.37 
5 1,585 4.47 4.47 
6 1,745 4.48 4.51 
7 62 4.53 4.52 
Highest education 110 4.47 4.53 
Family income Very poor 427 4.41 4.37 
Poor 749 4.47 4.49 
Average 4,269 4.41 4.45 
With means 6,084 4.45 4.44 
Rich 1,209 4.43 4.34 
Gender Male 5,526 4.44 4.46 
Female 7,212 4.43 4.42 
Strength of Weak 1,226 4.26 4.29 
Religiousity Average 7,736 4.40 4.43 
Strong 3 776 4.57 4.49 
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In relation to income and education variables, such a finding may seem 
surprising since class variables usually are very good predictors of ethnic attitudes in 
the US. However, these findings also may confirm the argument that the remnants of 
egalitarian Soviet social system are still in place. This system made the incomes of 
different social groups quite comparable and while the collapse of communism did lead 
to the rapid creation of a new high-income class, that class is still very small. 
Moreover, the overall ethnic differences in terms of income characteristics remain 
trivial . This finding justifies the exclusion of the class variable from the analysis. 
These results indicate the crucial role of ethnic identity in feelings of distance 
from other ethnic groups. Thus, strong versus weak ethnic identifiers for the same 
ethnic group may indicate quite different levels of appreciation of other ethnic groups. 
This suggests the questionable validity of directly comparing inter-ethnic attitudes if 
each group's identity strength is not controlled. Indeed, strong ethnic identifiers for 
groups A and B may produce quite extreme views in relation to ethnic items, while 
weak identifiers for both groups may hold similar and moderate views on ethnic issues. 
However, if no attention is paid to identity strength, the resulting comparison may 
easily indicate considerable differences between ethnic/racial groups in perceptions of 
ethnic issues--even if caused by the radical views of the strong identifiers on the 
margms. 
Analysis of Sub-national-level Effects (School and Region) 
The nested design of the sample provides the basis for using Hierarchical 
Linear Modeling (HLM) in estimating the effect of school and regional homogeneity. 
Before turning to the actual HLM results, it is useful to examine the homogeneity 
effects in Table 10, which contains a comparison of the effects of school and regional 
homogeneity on the ethnic distinctiveness variable. This table indicates an important 
difference in the effects. Results show that an increase in the numbers of majority 
students in schools is related to an almost perfect linear increase in levels of ethnic 
distinctiveness. However, the effect of regional homogeneity is not linear at all. 
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Table I 0: Comparison of Ethnic Distinctiviness Variable by Homogeneity Levels 
Mean of Ethnic Distinctiveness 
Homogeneity 
level In school In region 
No majority 3.11 * 
I 0% majority 3 .50 3.87 
20 3.63 3.71 
30 3.65 3.90 
40 3.78 3.87 
50 4.11 3.89 
60 4.23 4.50 
f----
70 4.26 4.62 
80 4.55 4.63 
90 4.67 4.60 
100% majority 4.75 * 
and an increase in ethnic homogeneity at the regional level does not produce a linear 
increase in ethnic distinctiveness. 
Meanwhile, an analysis of the homogeneity effects cannot be done effectively 
without the taking the nested nature of the data into account. A simple inclusion of 
sub-national-level variables describing school and regional ethnic homogeneity in the 
ANOVA MCA procedure could lead to inflated coefficients for the homogeneity 
variables and probably distort results. If all higher order variables are directly 
disaggregated to the individual level, and school and regional characteristics are also 
assigned at the individual level, it is impossible to use the assumption of independence 
of observations underlining the classical statistical analysis (Bryk and Raudenbush, 
1992, p. xiv) . Indeed, while there are 12,830 individual cases in the data set ( and thus 
individual observations describing individual characteristics of the respondents and 
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their attitudes), there are only 245 observations of school homogeneity and 45 of 
regional homogeneity. 
The Hierarchical Linear Modeling procedure allows this problem to be solved 
by assuming that the slope of the ethnic distinctiveness regression equation depends 
linearly on class homogeneity. This approach assumes that effects are linear on both 
levels, and it takes the hierarchical structure into account. Due to the very complicated 
nature of the data-file design for running this analysis and some software limitations, 
regional and school homogeneity are analyzed on the same level (while, theoretically, 
they also should be put on separate levels). The analysis at the individual level is 
limited to ethnic and personal variables due to the weak performance of three control 
variables--income, gender, and religion--in the individual level ANOV A analysis 
presented above. 
Overall, the HLM analysis is performed for the two levels in the following 
design: 
a . First-level regression: y=b+ax1+ax2+ax3+e, where y is ethnic 
distinctiveness, x; is individual-level independent variables (identity, 
language, parents' ethnicity, and in-group interaction); b is the intercept for 
this regression, which is the result of the second-level regression. 
b. Second-level regression: b=g+az1+bz2+e, where z, is school- and regional-
level independent variables (school and regional homogeneity) and g is the 
intercept for this regression. 
Thus, HLM treats values of the intercept in the first~level regression (b) as the result of 
another regression, with the second-level variables as independent variables. 
Table 11 shows the results for the homogeneity effects in pa11 1, which indicate 
that school homogeneity has a significant positive effect on ethnic distinctiveness. At 
the same time, it reveals the effect of regional homogeneity not to be significant. 
The second part of the table shows the effects of the individual-level variables 
on ethnic distinctiveness. However, these differ from the ANOV A MCA analysis 
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Table 11: Hiererchical Linear Analysis of the Sch l d R . . 
Effects 00 an eg1onal Homogeneity 
1. Second-level EITects 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error T-ratio P-value Intercept 2 3.84 0.08 48.72 0.00 
School homogeneity 0.07 0.01 7.76 0.00 
Regional homogeneity 0.01 0.01 0.78 0.43 
2. Individual-level Effects: 
Random Effect Standard Variance 
Deviation Comoonent Chi-square P-value 
Intercept I 0.34 0.11 582.04 0.00 
Identity 0.08 0.01 271.22 0.00 
Language 0.10 0.01 223.17 0.01 
Interaction with out-group 0.10 0.01 202.65 0.06 
Parents' ethnicity 0.04 0.00 205.53 0.04 
Level-I , R 0.88 0.78 
above, since HLM allows a control for the nested design. The overall results are very 
much the same as for the ANOVA model, with the important exception of the effect of 
out-group interaction on ethnic distinctiveness, which is not significant. The ANOVA 
results described above, meanwhile, show that while interaction is significant here its 
overall effect on ethnic distinctiveness is quite small (beta, .05). These findings 
together probably indicate that the social interaction level may not have as a strong 
effect on ethnic distancing as might be believed. Still, the HLM analysis indicates the 
strong role of identity and parental ethnicity in predicting the degree of an individual 
ethnic distinctiveness, while the effect of the language variable is somewhat weaker. 
Thus, overall, the personal ethnic identity and school homogeneity variables are 
the strongest predictors of how different students rate the ethnic majority in each 
country in relation to the major ethnic minority. The HLM analysis thus confirms 
statistically that the effects of regional homogeneity on ethnic distinctiveness are not 
non-significant, while the impact of school homogeneity is significant and positive. 
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This confirms Blau1s (1994) theory that homogeneity in immediate proximity to the 
individual is much more important than homogeneity at the higher (regional) level. 
National-level Factors 
The following analysis concentrates on ethnic conflicts and percentages of the 
minority in the population; these factors have an important effect on the psychological 
processes associated with ethnic distinctiveness. Due the limited number of cases 
related to these factors (there are only 11 countries), the analysis of their effect will be 
conducted not so much through direct statistical procedures, as through more indirect 
descriptive procedures. 
First, an individual-level analysis is performed on a country-by-country basis 
using ANOVA MCA procedures in order to assess the model ' s working within each 
country. Second, these results are compared across all countries and contrasted with 
the level of conflicts and ethnic homogeneity in each country. 
Russia 
The results for Russia are shown in Table 12. The largest country in the post-
Soviet world had managed to avoid any major ethnic conflict prior to this sample data 




IDENTITY ** strength of ethnic identity .28 .21 
PARE TH* parents' ethnicity .25 .10 
LANGUAGE language spoken .16 .02 
INTERACT interaction in-, out-group .08 .06 
PAREDUC parents' education .05 .03 
rNCOME family income .07 .05 
GENDER .01 .01 
RELIGION strength of religion .03 .03 
R=.30 R2= .10 
* * significant at <. 01 level * significant at <. 05 level 
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collection. Indeed, the war in Chechnya began after these data were collected. 
Potential conflict with the largest minority within Russia - ethnic Tatars - so far has 
been avoided, although some tensions remain. As a result, ethnic awareness by Russian 
students has not been affected significantly and the overall variance explained by the 
model is only .10 (R square). Identity is the strongest factor in the Russian sample 
(beta, .21 ). Parents' ethnicity is second with a beta of .1 O; however, this variable is only 
significant at the .05 level. Other variables do not have a significant effect on ethnic 
distinctiveness. This may be explained in terms of the low proportion of Tatars in 
Russia, and the low level of serious ethnic tensions between Russians and Tatars, 
combined with Russian respondents' low awareness of Tatars in general. Still, the 
impact of the identity variable is quite pronounced, and updated data collections will 
probably yield a much more significant predictive model for Russians as opposed to 
others due to the Chechnya confrontation. 
Ukraine 
While Russians and Ukrainians are close ethnically, the model indicates 
important differences between respondents in Russia and Ukraine. Indeed, as shown in 
Table 13, four ethnic variables and one control variable (religion) have significant 
impacts on ethnic distinctiveness. Moreover, R2 for the model is much higher (.23). As 
with the Russian sample, the identity variable has the strongest effect with beta of .28, 
followed by the parent's ethnicity variable with a beta of .16. This repeats the pattern in 
the Russian sample. However, in the Ukrainian sample, three more variables are 
significant, though their effect is much weaker than that of the first variables. The 
language and interaction variables have betas of .08 and .07. Interestingly, while 
religion has a significant effect on the dependent variable, its effect is low (beta, .07). 
Although Ukraine had not experienced serious ethnic conflicts, the proportion of 
minority Russians within Ukraine is almost 22%, a potential threat to the majority. 
Also, the Russian minority in the Crimean peninsula has been expressing some 
separatist tendencies, which may explain the stronger model for the Ukrainian case. 
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Table 13: ANOV A-MCA Results for Ukraine 
Beta 
Adjusted 
Eta for Factors 
IDENTITY** strength of ethnic identity .44 .28 
PARETH** parents' ethnicity .40 .16 
LANGUAGE** language spoken .28 .08 
INTERACT* interaction in-out-group .12 .07 
P AREDUC parents' education .08 .07 
INCOME family income .09 .05 
GENDER .03 04 
RELIGION** strenh,th of religion .17 .07 
R=.48 R2= .23 
** significant at < .01 level * significant at < .05 level 
Belarus 
Russians and Belorusians as ethnic groups are in many instances almost 
inseparable, with a high level of intermarriage, the same religion, and very close 
languages. As Table 14 shows, this seems to make it very difficult for respondents to 
differentiate between Russians and Belorusians. Survey results show that only 7% of 
ethnic Belorusian students use the Belorus language all the time, while the rest are 
Russian speakers. Such closeness between two ethnic groups, in combination with the 




IDENTITY ** strength of ethnic identity .24 .19 
PARETH** parents' ethnicity .22 .16 
LANGUAGE lan,guage spoken .08 .05 
INTERACT interaction in-, out-group .08 .05 
PAREDUC parents' education .06 .06 
INCOME family income .04 .05 
GENDER .02 .02 
RELIGION strenf,'1:h of religion .08 .05 
R=.30 R2= .09 
* * significant at <. 01 level * significant at <. 05 level 
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absence of any conflicts, should produce a weak model. Indeed, R2 is quite low - only 
. 09. Still, ethnic identity is the strongest factor (beta, .19), followed by parents' 
ethnicity (beta, .16). Other factors are insignificant. 
Latvia 
This Baltic country with the largest Russian-speaking population (about 40%) 
experienced serious conflicts with its minority before and after its independence. 
Though conflict never reached anything close to military confrontation, the divisive 
issue of state language and limitations on Latvian citizenship for Russian-speaking 
residents led to numerous protests and deep-seated resentment. Thus, it is not 
surprising that the model predicted best in the Latvian sample, with a R2 of .50 (see 
Table 15). All ethnic variables are significant. Moreover, language (the key issue in 
ethnic relations in Latvia) is the strongest factor, with a beta of .32. In second place is 
identity (beta, .26) followed by parents' ethnicity (.21), and interaction (.09). Here, 
effects of ethnic conflict and country homogeneity probably produce a combined 
effect: the majority is not only in conflict with the minority, but it also is threatened by 
its numbers. 
Table 15: ANOVA-MCA Results for Latvia 
Beta Adjusted 
Eta for Factors 
IDENTITY** strength of ethnic identity .64 .26 
P ARETH* parents' ethnicity .64 .21 
LANGUAGE** language spoken .64 .32 
INTERACT* interaction in-, out-group .22 .09 
P AREDUC parents' education .11 .06 
INCOME family income .10 .05 
GENDER .03 .07 
RELIGION strength ofreligion .04 .07 
R=. 70 R2= .50 
* * significant at <. 01 level * significant at <. 05 level 
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Moldova 
Similar confrontations caused by language laws in Moldova led to direct 
military conflict between the central government and Russian-speaking separatists in 
the Trans-Dniester region. Again, as for the Latvian sample, the model works well, 
with an R2 of .44 (as shown in Table 16). Similarly to Latvia, language is the strongest 
factor with a beta of .31 , followed by parents' ethnicity (beta, .23), identity (.16) and 
religion (.09). 
Table 16: ANOVA-MCA Results for Moldova 
Beta 
Eta Adjusted for 
Factors 
IDENTITY** strength of ethnic identity .57 .16 
PARETH** parents' ethnicity .57 .23 
LANGUAGE** language spoken .60 .3 1 
INTERACT interaction in-, out-group .24 .07 
P AREDUC parents' education .11 .09 
INCOME* family income .09 .09 
GENDER .03 .04 
RELIGION** strength of religion .24 .09 
R=.66 R2= .44 
* * significant at <. 01 level * significant at <. 05 level 
Kazakstan 
ln Kazakstan, whose population is almost 40% ethnic Russian and which has 
divisive ethnic and language problems, the model is quite strong (with an R2 of .37) 
(see Table 17). As in Latvia and Moldova, the ethnic identity and language variables 
proved to be the strongest predictors of ethnic distinctiveness (betas, .31 and 1 7), 
followed by interaction (beta, .11 ). 
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IDENTITY * strength of ethnic identity .56 .31 
P ARETH parents' ethnicity .56 .15 
LANGUAGE** language spoken .49 .17 
INTERACT** interaction in-, out-group .28 .11 
P AREDUC parents' education .10 .09 
INCOME family income .17 .04 
GENDER .03 .04 
RELIGION strength of religion .19 .03 
R=.60 R2= .37 
** significant at <.01 level* significant at <.05 level 
Kyrgyzstan 
Kyrgyzstan repeats Kazakstani patterns in many instances, probably as a result 
of geographical closeness as well as ethnic affinity between Kazaks and K yrgyzis and 
similar ethnic problems with the Russian minority. However, as shown in Table 18, the 
model is weaker here (R2 =0.19) likely due to the low proportion of ethnic Russians. 
The strongest factor is parents' ethnicity with a beta of .23, followed by identity (.18), 
and language (.17). The control variables of religion and income also are significant, 
though their effect is much weaker. 




IDENTITY ** strength of ethnic identity .30 .18 
PARETH* parents' ethnicity .32 .23 
LANGUAGE** language spoken .30 .17 
INTERACT interaction in-, out-group .09 .09 
P AREDUC parents' education .22 .18 
INCOME* family income .16 .10 
GENDER .01 .02 
RELIGION** strength of religion .05 .04 
R=.43 R2= .19 
** significant at <.01 level * significant at <.05 level 
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Tajikistan 
The Tajik case does not fit well with the other countries in the sample for one 
important reason: the country is experiencing a bloody civil war between regional clan 
factions, and the Russian population have largely fled . The chaos in the country has 
created somewhat different pictures of social reality among respondents, which may be 
putting Jess emphasis on ethnic identity and more on regional loyalties. As shown in 
Table 19, while the model is significant, (R squared = .13), only two factors are 
significant at the .05 level: language (beta of .12) and family income (.10). Ethnic 
identity and parent's ethnicity are not significant at all. 




IDENTITY strength of ethnic identity .30 .14 
PARETH parents' ethnicity .30 .15 
LANGUAGE* language spoken .29 .12 
INTERACT interaction in-, out-group .08 .08 
P AREDUC parents' education .08 .08 
INCOME* family income .15 .10 
GENDER .06 .03 
RELIGION strength of religion .11 .05 
R=.37 R2= .13 
* significant at <.05 level 
Georgia 
When the republic of Georgia was torn by ethnic conflicts, ethnic Russians 
were not part of these confrontations. As a result, the model is quite weak (R2 =.07), 
as shown in Table 20. There are only two significant factors: interaction (beta, .12) and 
religion (.14) . 
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IDENTITY strength of ethnic identity .12 .10 
PARE TH parents' ethnicity .10 .09 
LANGUAGE language spoken .04 .06 
INTERACT** interaction in-, out-group .11 .12 
PAREDUC parents' education .04 .03 
INCOME family income .09 .09 
GENDER .03 .14 
RELIGION* * strength of religion .14 .14 
R=.26 R2= .07 
* * significant at <. 0 J level * significant at <. 05 level 
Armenia 
Armenians also have not had many problems with that country's extremely 
small ethnic Russian minority. Therefore, as shown in Table 21 the model is very weak 
(R squared = .07) and all significant variables are significant at the .05 level. The 
strongest predictor of ethnic distinctiveness here is parents' ethnicity (beta, .18), 
followed by parental education (.13) and interaction (.10). Gender has some effect 
(beta, .06), though it is very weak. 




IDENTITY strength of ethnic identity .31 .08 
P ARETH* parents' ethnicity .34 .18 
LANGUAGE language spoken .32 .11 
INTERACT* interaction in-out-group .19 .10 
PAREDUC* parents' education .12 .13 
INCOME family income .06 .07 
GENDER* .04 .06 
RELIGION strength of religion .11 .10 
R = .4 1 R 2= . 1 7 
* significant at <.05 level 
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Azerbaijan 
As in Armenia and Georgia, there is no majority conflict with the small ethnic 
Russian minority here. As a result, the overall significance of the model is only .07 
(R2) , as shown in Table 22. Only two variables--language and income--are significant 
at the .05 level. Income is a somewhat stronger predictor (beta, .13) than language 
(.08); however, the overall effect is evidently weak. 




IDENTITY strength of ethnic identity .07 .07 
PARE TH parents' ethnicity .08 .07 
LANGUAGE* language spoken .10 .08 
INTERACT interaction in-, out-group .1 7 .15 
P AREDUC parents' education .11 .1 1 
INCOME* family income .13 .13 
GENDER .03 .04 
RELIGION strength of religion .06 .05 
R= .27 R2= .07 
* significant at < .05 level 
Summary of The Within-Country Analyses 
The importance of societal factors in ethnic relations is well accepted in the 
social sciences. However, inter-country comparison may be quite difficult, since 
controlling for variances in social characteristics, such as economic development, 
history of ethnic relations, governmental policy, etc. is not easy. Statistical 
comparisons become especially hard to use if the number of cases is low. However, as 
mentioned earlier, the similar political and economic nature of the post-Soviet states 
makes it somewhat easier to conduct comparisons disregarding economic and 
historical variables, a step that may not be justified in other cases. 
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Table 23 shows the number of significant individual-level ethnic variables, with 
an indication of their significance across countries as well as in the total sample. If the 
variable is significant, it is assigned a value of 1 in the table, or O if it is not. The value 
of the beta coefficients, which shows the strength of this variable in the model, is in 
brackets. 




Etlmic Variables in the Original Model 
Parents' 
ldentity Ethnicity Language Interaction 
(Betas) (Betas) (Betas) (Betas) 
Latvia 1 (.26) 1 (.21) 1 (.32) 1 (.09) 4 
Moldova l (.16) 1 (.23) 1 (.31) 0 (.07) 3 
Kazakstan l (.31) 0 (.15) 1 (.17) l (.1 I) 3 
Ukraine I (.44) l (. 16) 1 (.08) 0 (.07) 3 
Kyrgyzstan I (.18) I (.23) 1 (.17) 0 (.09) 3 
Tajikistan 0 (.14) 0 (.15) 1 (.12) 0 (.08) 1 
Russia 1 (.21) 1 (.10) 0 (.01) 0 (.06) 2 
Belarus I (.19) I (.16) 0 (.05) 0 (.05) 2 
Georgia 0 (.08) 1 (.18) 0 (.11) l (.10) 2 
Azerbaijan 0 (.07) 0 (.07) 1 (.08) 0 (.15) 1 
Armenia 0 (. I 0) 0 (.09) 0 (.06) 1 (.12) 1 
Total 1 (.22) 1 (.17) 1 (.07) I (.05) 4 
sample 
These results are incorporated into Table 24, which compares the overall 
explanatory power of the model with individual- and societal-level factors across 
country samples. The results presented in this table are ranked by the variance 
explained by the model and compared with the initial conflict ranking for the countries. 
The table' s layout allows a comparison of the effect of societal-level factors , such as 
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country homogeneity and level of ethnic conflict, with individual ethnic perception 
variables. 
Table 24 largely confirms initial hypotheses about the importance of country 
homogeneity to feelings of ethnic distancing from the minority, as well as the crucial 
role of conflict in this process. Indeed, the proposed model for ethnic distinctiveness 
works best in Latvia, where the explanatory power of the model is very high (R2 = 
50) Moreover, all four factors in the model are significant. This corresponds with the 
highest proportion of the minority population ( 48%) and the high level of conflict 
within the Latvian society. The confrontation, which began with mandated Latvian 
Table 24: Comparison of Original Model and Model Factors Significant Across 
Countries' Samples 
Number of Model's 
Significant Societal-level Factors Significance 
Factors (from (R2) 
Table 24) 
Country homo- Initial ranking 
geneity by the level of 
(proportion of conflict (from 
minority in % ) Table 2) 
Latvia 4 48 2 .50 
Moldova 3 13 3 .44 
Kazakstan 3 38 2 .38 
Ukraine 3 22 l .23 
Kyrgyzstan 3 22 1 .19 
Tajikistan l 8 2 .13 
Russia 2 6 1 .10 
Belorus 2 13 0 .09 
Georgia 2 6 0 .07 
Azerbaijan l 6 0 .07 
Armenia l 2 0 .07 
For the total 4 10 (.21) .30 .30 
sample 
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language requirements in the early 1990s, is ongoing and has led to numerous 
diplomatic interventions from European governments. Evidently, the divisions between 
ethnic groups participating in this conflict have become acute and explicit. Similar 
conflict arose in Moldova, next in line after Latvia. This country has experienced a 
protracted conflict with its Russian minority, which constitutes l 3% of its population. 
The countries of Kazakstan and Ukraine, where ethnic minority Russians live 
mostly in regions bordering the Russian Federation, show the same results in many 
instances. The model of ethnic distinctiveness is strong for both societies, with three 
out of four factors present and with R2 equal to .38 and .23, respectively. While these 
results are somewhat lower than in the previous two cases, if conflicts do reach a 
higher level, results very likely will resemble the Latvian or Moldovan patterns. Indeed, 
the Russian minorities in Ukraine and Kazakstan have experienced the discomfort of 
being a minority; many experts beleive strong separatist movements in these areas are 
possible under certain circumstances. However, the divisions between majority and 
minority are still not so acute here as in Latvia and Moldova. Following Ukraine and 
Kazakstan on this list is Kyrgyzstan, which borders Kazakstan and is quite close to the 
latter in cultural and ethnic terms. Here, minority Russians are mostly urban and so are 
not concentrated along the border with Russia as in the previous case. The somewhat 
weaker comparison with the Kazakstan model may be explained by the lower 
proportion of minorities (22% vs. 3 8%) in these countries. 
The social processes in Tajikistan are very different from other post-Soviet 
state. This country has experienced a brutal civil war and as some observers argue it is 
problematic to talk about Tajik ethnicity as such, since clan warfare has increased 
regional loyalties at the expense of the national Tajik identity. Thus, the Tajikistan data 
may well be ignored in the overall analysis. 
The results for the Russian Federation fit quite well in the general pattern, even 
though ethnic distinctiveness in the Russian sample was measured not towards ethnic 
Russians (as in other states), but towards the largest minority of ethnic Tatars. Still, the 
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low proportions of Tatars in Russia ( 6%) and the low levels of confrontation are 
consistent with the weaker model (R2 = .10) with only two factors being significant. 
In spite of its relatively considerable proportion of ethnic Russians (13%), the 
results for the Slavic country of Belarus do not indicate the strength of the model (R2 
is only .09, with two factors being significant). However, this should not be surprising, 
given that Belorusians and Russians are very close ethnic groups. Moreover, only 7% 
of majority Belorusian respondents in our sample said that they speak Belarusian; the 
majority speak Russian instead. Because of such ethnic closeness, the model does not 
work there, since there are no clear divisions between groups. 
The remaining countries of the South Caucasus (Georgia, Azerbaijan and 
Armenia) have relatively small proportions (less than 6%) of Russians in their 
populations. Moreover, these minorities as a rule are not involved in significant ethno-
politics. Therefore, they cannot be considered a threat to the ethnic majority. 
Overall, these data show that the proposed model has the strongest explanatory 
power in countries where the differences between majority and minority are most 
meaningful, where the proportion of a minority is significant, and where the conflicts 
between majority and minority are more intense. In cases where there is little difference 
between the majority and minority ( as in Belarus), the suggested model does not work 
very well. 
If the minority is very small, it cannot be part of ethno-politics. For example, in 
Armenia, the small ethnic Russian population can hardly become a party to ethnic 
confrontations. On the other hand, in societies with a significant minority population, 
an ethnic minority may be perceived as a potential threat to the majority. Of course, 
conflict does not necessarily result from such structural conditions. However, as 
pointed out by Blau (1994), without these conditions, conflict is simply impossible. 
Such structural limitations are very important because they determine the parameters 
of ethnic relations and the associated theoretical models. 
Meanwhile, it is highly likely that if ethnic distinctiveness is measured against 
ethnic minorities which are part of ethno-political processes, the resulting model will 
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have the same patterns as in societies in the upper parts of Table 24. For example, 
taking into account the current conflict between Russia and Chechnya, it may be 
interesting to test the model using Chechens (and not Tatars) as a minority group in 
the Russian sample. Similar analysis may be done for Azerbaijan and Armenia, which 




SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
In summary, the data have confirmed some of the initial hypotheses but not 
1. Ethnic distinctiveness was expected to increase as a function of greater in-
group contact, since greater in-group contact presumably leads to less 
interaction with the outside group. According to the contact hypothesis 
(Allport, 1954), this will result in less positive attitudes toward the latter. 
However, the data produced mixed results, showing that in-group contact as 
a factor in the formation of ethnic distinctiveness is weak at best, especially 
in comparison with the impact of ethnic identity and ethnic homogeneity 
variables. 
2. Ethnic distinctiveness was expected to increase as a function of the greater 
importance of ethnic identity, since it presumably leads to stronger 
attachments to the in-group and lower evaluations of the out-group, 
according to Tajfel (1978). Indeed, the data show that stronger ethnic 
identifiers have higher ethnic distinctiveness, confirming this hypotheses. 
3. It also was expected that a higher level of parents' titular identification 
would create a higher level of ethnic distinctiveness the former would 
produce higher titular identification for students and thus lead to greater 
ethnic distancing from the contrast group. This hypothesis has been 
confirmed as well. It seems that parents' ethnic identification is a very 
important factor in these students' feelings of ethnic distinctiveness, so these 
factors can be considered quite close, though their impact differs somewhat 
across countries. 
4 . It was hypothesized that ethnic distinctiveness is higher for those 
respondents using the majority language more often. It was suggested that 
such respondents have less experience with members of an out-group and so 
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develop a higher level of out-group distancing. Indeed, the data analysis 
generally confirms this hypothesis. Meanwhile, the strongest effect of the 
language variable is in the countries where language issues are an important 
part of the political conflict between minority and majority: in other 
countries, this hypothesis was not confirmed, either because of the closeness 
of majority/minority languages or the social irrelevance of the language issue 
(as when the overwhelming proportion of the population speaks only one 
language). 
5. Another hypothesis suggested that a higher level of ethnic homogeneity ( at 
the micro-level) leads to a higher level of ethnic distancing, presupposing 
infrequent and indirect contact between respondent and representatives of 
the different ethnic groups. Data analysis clearly supported this hypothesis. 
Indeed, the effect of school homogeneity is quite strong, especially in 
comparison to the non-significant effect of regional homogeneity. These 
findings partly confirm another initial suggestion: that micro-heterogeneity is 
more important for positive ethnic relations than macro-heterogeneity (Blau, 
1994). However, homogeneity at the societal level does seem to have a 
significant effect. This may be due to different psychological mechanisms, 
which are less connected to people's interactions than to the majority 
group's perception of the minority group as a potential threat, and the 
minority ' s perception of the majority group as dominant. 
6 . It was hypothesized that less parental education would lead to higher levels 
of ethnic distancing, since many studies have found that higher educational 
level is associated with more tolerance for minorities. However, present 
study results indicate that parents' education is a weak predictor of ethnic 
distancing. It is possible that individual education may affect ethnic 
distancing, because it is probably associated with specific experiences. 
(Presumably, more years in school will lead to a lower level of distancing.) 
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7. Study results also indicate that family income is a weak predictor of ethnic 
distancing level; this may be a legacy of the Soviet egalitarian system and a 
weak relations with parental education. 
8. Results also indicate that ethnic distancing processes tend to be much 
stronger in those societies with higher levels of ethnic conflict. Possibly, 
higher levels of conflict lead to the higher level of salience of ethnic identity 
and distancing from the other group, since it creates a direct or perceived 
threat to ethnic group welfare. 
A summary of all results may be found in Table 25. 
Table 25: Effects of Independent Variables on Ethnic Distinctiveness 
Independent Variable Effect 
National-
Sub-national- level 
Individual-level level Descriptive 
(ANOVNMCA) HLM Comparison 
Ethnic identity Strong 
Pa,ents ' ethnic identification Strong 
In-group contact Weak 
Language Moderate 
Ethnic homogeneity at school Strong 
level 
Ethnic homogeneity at regional No effect 
level 
National conflict Strong 
Ethnic homogeneity at societal Strong 
level 
Parents ' education Weak. 
Family income Weak 
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Among the most significant findings of this research is that levels of ethnic 
identity play the strongest role in distancing the individual from outsiders. In this 
regard, interactions with outsiders are less important. Another important finding is that 
the level of homogeneity in the immediate environment is more important than that at 
the larger regional level. However, societal-level homogeneity has a strong effect, 
while higher levels of ethnic conflict within a society correspond to more ethnic 
distancing. 
The importance of ethnic identity in ethnic distancing underlined in this 
research has important theoretical and methodological implications. Among other 
things, it suggests that ethnic distancing is not merely a product of membership in a 
racial/ethnic group per se, but rather results from the salience of one's ethnic identity 
and the extent of identification with own ethnic group. Thus, differences may be found 
within any ethnic group in terms the strength of each member's feelings of closeness 
with their own group. It is possible that in many cases, if strength of ethnic identity is 
not controlled, responses of the small numbers of very strong identifiers ( ethnic 
extremists) may considerably distort results. For example, on the basis of opinion polls, 
a researcher may conclude that deep divisions exist between races on some issues, 
while the real divisions are between ethnic extremists of two groups, with not much 
difference existing between the rest of the population in both races. 
It also is likely that class variables play a much lower role in ethnic processes 
than is widely believed. This study finds that parental education and family income 
variables have a very weak (if any) effect on ethnic distancing in comparison with 
ethnic variables, especially ethnic identity. While, in this particular case the remaining 
elements of Soviet egalitarism may in large part be responsible for such results, the 
attention to indicators of ethnic identity may provide more explanatory power for other 
models of ethnic relations and attitudes . 
That respondents attach less importance to inter-ethnic interaction is indeed 
quite intriguing. The first explanation that comes to mind is that respondents ' reporting 
is biased by their levels of social interaction with outsiders. Indeed, some may interpret 
a question about a high level of interaction as being related to "friendship" or close 
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"affinity," while others may consider presence in the school or community of other 
ethnic groups as indicating that they have a high level of interaction with outsiders--
even if no intimate interaction takes place. 
However, it is quite likely that the mere observation of minority group behavior 
in school by majority students (assuming sufficient minority numbers) will indicate their 
internal diversity, even if no close personal interaction occurs. Meanwhile, the results 
do not show that interaction is not important--only that its impact is somewhat weaker 
than that of identity. 
Thus, a larger proportion of outsiders in one's immediate proximity (as in 
class) may lead to lower feelings of distinctiveness, since majority respondents will 
have more chances to see differences within a minority group and may find that some 
minority students have many things in common with them. However, if the number of 
minority members in a school is small, then they will be observed as a more 
homogenous group and presumably as having more in common among themselves. 
This will strengthen the stereotyping process. Of course, these two factors are closely 
connected, since without minority students such interactions are not possible. Still, this 
research indicates that intimate interactions (such as friendship) may not be a key 
element in the distancing process, while non-intimate interactions ( observation) seem 
to have stronger effects. 
Another important finding is the different effects of language on ethnic 
distinctiveness across countries. One of the possible explanations is the difference in 
language closeness between majority and minority languages. For example, the 
Ukrainian and Belorusian languages are closer to Russian than to Moldovan or Kazak. 
Another factor is the social policy significance of the language issues. Indeed, the 
countries affected most by the language variable are Moldova and Latvia, where the 
forceful introduction of titular languages has been the main reason for majority-
minority confrontations. 
The differences in how the two levels of homogeneity influence ethnic 
distancing are quite interesting. Homogeneity in immediate proximity to the individual 
(school level) makes a difference in feelings of ethnic distancing from outsiders. 
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Indeed, segregation of students by ethnic criteria, even in highly heterogeneous areas, 
would create fewer opportunities for interactions of any kind - and according to the 
contact hypothesis, lower evaluations of outsiders. Thus, some manipulation of the 
proportion of the ethnic minority in immediate school settings may produce fewer 
feelings of ethnic distinctiveness: increasing the minority proportion in school may 
decrease perceptions of its difference. 
However, regional homogeneity does not have a similar effect, since the actual 
proportions of minorities within the larger region do not directly correspond with that 
observed by individuals within their immediate surroundings. Obviously, the unit size is 
the critical factor here. To produce a direct psychological effect, individuals should 
experience particular ethnic homogeneity around themselves. Indeed, even if regional 
homogeneity ( at about the level of a U.S. state) is very high, the ethnic distancing 
variable may not be directly affected because a person may live in a small but highly 
heterogeneous city within a homogeneous state. Overall, this study confirms Blau's 
argument that heterogeneity in one's immediate environment has a direct effect on 
social relations, while impact of the higher level heterogeneity is susceptible to the 
effects of intervening variables. 
Another important finding is that ethnic homogeneity at the societal level has 
considerable effect on the ethnic distinctiveness process. However, it seems that the 
mechanisms by which societal homogeneity influences ethnic attitudes differ from 
those for regional homogeneity. Similarly, it is not the daily observations that play a 
role, but the knowledge of the numeric stren!:,>th of the particular ethnic group. Thus, 
by virtue of its numbers, the minority may be perceived as a threat to majority group 
domination, while a very small minority may simply be ignored. 
On the other hand, the minority proportion within a society is the most 
important base for any political movement by an ethnic minority, since in some cases 
the minority may be quite numerous, though scattered around the country. A mere 
perception of being in the minority may lead to overall negative attitudes toward the 
majority group, which would be considered dominant and therefore hostile. If the 
minority is not numerous, it may perceive majority domination as overwhelming and 
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assimilation would be more acceptable. On the other hand, if the minority numbers are 
substantial, they may feel ready for confrontation and the reciprocal reaction of the 
majority may be adversarial; moreover, if communal conflicts are interpreted in ethnic 
terms, they may further exacerbate mutual prejudice. Importantly, even if the majority 
seems to be firmly in control, conflict still may erupt--much as Coleman (1957) 
argued," .. . whenever a pattern of control is so complete that the minority can see no 
way of moving to a position of power, either individually or as a group, there may exist 
sporadic and irrational outbursts, but not organized opposition" (p. 16). 
Since such institutional factors as population homogeneity cannot be easily 
manipulated, it seems that some societies have always had a predisposition for poor 
ethnic relations, even if economic and educational differences are small and cultural 
differences are negligible. Intervening factors may simply exacerbate the existing ethnic 
differences. Thus, even in a tolerant country such as Ukraine, mere division of 
ethnically and culturally close ethnic groups (Russian and Ukrainians) across 
majority/minority lines leads to a somewhat negative perception of the majority by the 
minority. Much higher levels of ethnic salience should be expected in societies with 
more pronounced economic and cultural differences between groups and with a recent 
history of ethnic confrontation. One possible way out of this problem is to lessen the 
emphasis on the ethnic element of identity by ignoring ethnicity in political discourse. 
However, this task may be quite challenging for traditionally ethnically structured 
societies. 
Overall, this study underlines the significance of both macro-level and micro-
level factors in ethnic attitudes and relations. Of course, it is quite a challenging to take 
all factors into account since ethnic identity is not only a product of family upbringing, 
but also is highly susceptible to pervasive social dynamics within a larger society. 
Still, this research demonstrates the importance of taking macro-level variables 
into account in ethnic perception research. Indeed, the original model ' s assumptions--
that ethnic distancing is a product of strength of ethnic identity, family ethnic 
background, and out-group interaction--is applicable mainly to societies in which 
majority and minority ethnic groups are significantly differentiated from one another 
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and are involved in ethno-political process. In countries where the ethnic minority is 
too close to the majority in cultural terms, the use of the suggested model may not be 
justified. 
Moreover, the study shows that a minority's proportion in a country's 
population also is important because the proposed model works quite well in countries 
with proportionally large minorities. In societies with a very small particular minority, 
the model has weak explanatory power. For example, in the U.S., the racial relations of 
Whites vs. Blacks, or Whites vs. Latinos, may be studied using this model, while 
research on Whites vs. Uzbeks is hardly justified due to the extremely small numbers of 
the latter ethnic group within the U.S. society. Such limitations (or scope conditions) 
suggest a useful framework for future application of the ethnic distinctiveness model in 
the analysis of ethnic relations. 
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ENDNOTES 
1 Wrule the old regime exercised its power through a privileged class of 
nobility and was ruled by the Tsar's decrees, the new communist government 
eventually developed the use of the nomenclature class and Party Central Committee 
orders instead. In both societies political competition was allowed only within a 
privileged class (nobility, nomenclature), and the legislature was always very weak. 
2 The overall system of power in the USSR was highly hierarchical, with 
extremely strong executive authorities which enjoyed wide powers over the respective 
territory. The "party line" was established exclusively by a narrow group in the 
Politburo and was executed through a system of party committees, with the regional 
party committees being the key element of control. In the absence of any real electoral 
process, appointments to the power positions depended mostly on top-level decisions. 
3 This situation did not necessarily mean the existence of a colonial structure in 
classic terms. Local elites were not completely powerless and ethnic Russians did not 
get much economic benefit out of their dominant status. The reality was some balance 
of power inside the union republics, the center of which was slowly moving from 
Moscow to local elites. Starting with Khrushchev, some key positions in each republic 
started to be reserved for titular groups; this became an unwritten tradition. 
4 While in the late 1980s Gorbachev initially tried to break the ethnic republic 
bureaucracy by moving ethnic Russian appointees there, Rywkin (1994) argues, "The 
policy of 'parachuting in' Russian apparatchiks to break up local fiefdoms lost 
legitimacy in the context of Gorbachev' s liberalization drive with its slogans of 
glasnost and democratization. Many formerly purged native officials resurfaced and 
alleged that they had suffered from national discrimination . . . Party leaders in the 
republics were forced to seek grass-roots support" (pp. 185-186). 
5 Thus, as Marshall (1993) points out, the slow disintegration of the USSR led 
the opposition mobilization to be "channeled into the only alternative organizational 
vehicles available in those systems: the networks oflegal or semi-legal cultural 
organizations and the formal structures of nationality based regional administration" 
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(p. 180). In this situation, local party leaders had a much stronger resource base than 
new democratic/cultural organizations, and control over the institutions of power was 
slowly transferred to them. 
6 
Rywkin (1994) appropriately noted that the subjects of Kremlinology, the 
economics of socialism, Marxist-Leninist ideology, party structure, the military and the 
KGB, and literary dissent, took priority over sociological research into ethnic 
problems. These were viewed as secondary and virtually irrelevant to the stability of 
the Soviet Union. 
7 For example, Kaiser (1995) argues that in the Baltics, "A titular hegemony of 
the work force had been achieved prior to independence .. . the laws passed in the Baltic 
states to favor the titular nation and language are more a formalization and 
legitimization of previously existing informal titular favoritism" (p.109). It also is 
important to note that participants in ethnic clashes were as a rule people of the same 
economic status. 
8 On the contrary, as Rywkin (1994) argues, the most prosperous did, with a 
better educated workforce, as did the Baltic republics, Western Ukraine, Armenia, and 
Georgia (p. 151 ). This looks like a "reverse" inequality uprising, meaning that the 
richer region wanted to secede from the poorer one. 
9 Tishkov (1995) found the sources of Uzbek-Kyrgyz conflict in the Osh region 
in Kyr1:,,yzstan (60% Kyrgyz; 26% Uzbek) in the collapse of the power balance in 
Soviet republics and the distribution of higher-ranking and prestigious positions 
between the leading regional clans ( observed for decades and to some extent reflecting 
former tribal distinctions as well as culturally specific groupings within Kyrgyzstan) (p. 
134). 
HJ In his opinion, "viewed from a social distance an individual takes on the 




Among individual-level analysis one important group of theories was derived 
from the authoritarian personality tradition, with its distinctive intrapsychic approach 
(Adorno et al., 1950). Adorno and his followers argued that unacceptable 
sexual/aggressive impulses among some individuals can be transformed into 
permanently intolerant attitudes toward outsiders or any minority (regardless of race, 
religion, language, etc.). According to this approach, then, internal conflict becomes 
externalized. Such tolerant or intolerant qualities are presumably permanent and part of 
one ' s ethnic character. The authoritarian personality approach was challenged almost 
immediately on methodological grounds. Altemeyer (1988) has claimed that "the 
psychoanalytic model has virtually no evidence to support its most distinctive feature: 
the importance of certain early childhood experience in a special home environment. 
And its array of unconscious mechanisms has proved difficult to verify and ultimately 
discouraging even to pursue" (p . 331 ). 
Using the intra-psychic paradigm, Katz (Katz, 1981; Katz, Wackenhut, and 
Hass, 1986) explained White Americans' ambivalence in attitudes towards Black 
Americans by pointing out the value conflict between American values of individualism 
(with their emphasis on individualistic values, hard work, personal responsibility, and 
self-reliance) and egalitarianism (with its emphasis on compassion and 
humanitarianism). According to the logic of this approach, while Blacks deserve 
compassion on the basis on egalitarianism, their violation of individualistic norms leads 
to resentment and attribution of their failures to their personal traits . 
Sherif and Sherif(l953) argued that formation of attitudes of prejudice "is 
functionally related to becoming a group member -- to adopting the group and its 
values (norms) as the main anchorage in regulating experience and behavior" (p. 218). 
Thus, according to this theory, group norms play a decisive role in individual attitude 
formation and change, rather than individual decisions. 
The social learning theory of Bandura and Walters ( 1963) was applied to group 
relations in the form of a scape-goat hypothesis related to conditioned affective 
responses: "When a frustrating agent is feared, aggression will be displaced to a less-
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feared scape-goat. This explains occurrence of hostility and aggression toward 
minorities or members of out-group that are identifiably different from the social 
groups to which the aggressor belongs" (p. 18). 
These theories associate ethnic relations with the socioeconomic conditions in 
the society and maintain that the majority is tolerant in times of economic prosperity 
and prejudiced during crises and high unemployment. In this interpretation of 
ethnic/racial relations, the division of the working class along the ethnic lines reduces 
possibilities of social explosion (Rex, 1986). With regard to immigrant societies, once 
the migrants' structural location had been determined, the group's advance was largely 
derived from that location. Perlmann (1988), who studied ethnic groups in the U.S., 
fou nd that "in virtually every comparison across groups, social class origins and family 
structure played an important role in creating ethnic differences in schooling and work" 
(p. 204) . 
12 Van man and Miller ( 1993) argue that "whereas the categorization itself 
can be considered primarily a cognitive process, its consequences ( e.g., increasing the 
salience of a social identity) probably include emotional, motivational and other 
cognitive components" (p. 220). 
13 For comparative purposes, data from two Ukrainian samples (1992 and 
1995) are used in the research. However, it differs somewhat from the 1995 Ukrainian 
sample : six regions were selected in the 1992 Ukrainian survey, while five areas were 
selected in 1995 . Since the sample size for 1992 was 500 respondents due to cost 




r. Actual Measures as Used in Questiom1aires 
l. ETHNIC DISTfNCTIVENESS 
Questionnaire items: 
a. PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS: 
Please check one position on each of the following scales to reflect how you feel about that 
national/ethnic group . 
l. Majority group: 
Very In large Equally In large Very 
part part 
Q 1.1 Friendly l 2 3 4 5 (Unfriendly) 
QI .2. Peace loving 1 2 3 4 5 (Aggressive) 
Q 1 . 3. Hardworking l 2 3 4 5 (Lazy) 
Q 14. Trustworthy 2 
,., 
4 5 (Untrustworthy) _, 
Ql .5. Willing to 2 3 4 5 (Indifferent) 
help others 
Q 1.6. Open 2 3 4 5 (Not open) 
2. Minority group: 
Very In large Equally In Very 
part large 
part 
Q 1. I Friendly l 2 3 4 5 (Unfriendly) 
Q 1.2. Peace loving l 2 
,., 
4 5 (Aggressive) _) 
Ql.3 . Hardworking 1 2 3 4 5 (Lazy) 
Q l . 4. Trustworthy 1 2 3 4 5 (Untrustworthy) 
Q l . 5. Vl/illing to 1 2 3 4 5 (Indifferent) 
help others 
Q 1.6. Open l 2 
,., 
4 5 (Not open) _, 
The overall scores for each majority and minority evaluations were computed by 
summing up the scores for each characteristics. ["Do not knows" and missing data were 
recoded as 3 (the middle of the scale): Ql =Ql.l+Ql.2+Ql.3+Ql.4+Ql.5+Ql .6. 



















The ethnic distinctiveness variable was created by subtracting the first score (majority 




A. Questionnaire items: 
1. What is your ethnicity? ___________ [open ended question] . 
2. How Important Is Your Ethnic Identity to You? 
1. Not important 
2. Somewhat important 
3. Very important 
B Variables were recoded as follows : 
I. Majority identifiers were recoded as 2 (ethnic=2) 
Minority identifiers were recoded as 0. (ethnic=O) 
All other identifiers were recoded as 1. (etlmic= l) 
2. Strong majority identifiers were recoded as 6, strong minority identifiers were recoded as 0, 
as follows: 
IF (idenimp = 3 & ethnic= 2) identity = 6. 
lF (idenimp = 2 & etlmic = 2) identity= 5. 
IF (idenimp = l & ethnic= 2) identity = 4. 
IF (idenimp = 3 & ethnic = l) identity = 3. 
IF ( idenimp = 2 & ethnic = I) identity = 3. 
IF (idenimp = l & ethnic = I) identity= 3. 
IF (idenimp = l & ethnic= 0) identity= 2. 
IF (idenimp = 2 & ethnic = 0) identity = 1. 
IF (idenimp = 3 & ethnic = 0) identity = 1. 
3 . PARENTS ETHNICITY 
Questionnaire item : 
1. What is your father's ethnicity? _ ________ [open ended question] 
2. What is your mother's ethnicity? [open ended question] 
B . Variables were recoded. 
Majority fathers recoded as 2 (fathethn=2). 
Minority fathers were recoded as 0 . (fathethn=O). 
All other fathers recoded as l. (fathethn= l). 
Majority mothers recoded as 2. (mothethn=2). 
Minority mothers were recoded as 0. (mothethn=O) . 
All other mothers recoded as I. (mothetlm=l). 
PARENTS ETHNIClTY variable was as follows: 
IF (fathetlm =2 & mothethn=2) parethn = 6. 
IF (fathethn =2 & mothetlm=l) parethn = 4. 
IF (fathethn = 1 & mothethn=2) parethn = 5. 
IF (fathethn = l & mothethn= l) parethn = 3. 
IF (fathetlm =2 & mothethn=O) parethn = 3. 
IF (fathethn =O & mothethn=2) parethn = 3. 
IF (fathethn =0 & mothethn= l) parethn = 2 . 
IF (fathetlm = I & motl1etlm=O) parethn = 1. 
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lF (fathethn =0 & mothethn=O) parethn = 0. 
4. INTERACTION: 
Questionnaire item: To What Extent Do you Interact with Members of Other Ethnic Groups or 
Your Own Group? 
I . Interact only within other ethnic groups 
2. Interact mostly within other ethnic groups 
3. Interact equally with my own and other ethnic groups. 
4. Interact mostly with.in my own ethnic group 
5. Interact only within my own ethnic group 
5. PARENTS' EDUCATION 
Questionnaire item: What is the highest education your father completed? 
1. Some high-school 
2. Hjgh-school 
3. Vocational school 
4. Some college 
5. College 
6. Some graduate school 
7. Graduate degree 
8. Do not know 
9. No father 
Questionnaire item: What is the highest education your mother completed: 
1 . Some high-school 
2. High-school 
3. Vocational school 
4. Some college 
5. College 
6. Some graduate school 
7. Graduate degree 
8. Do no know 
9. No mother 
These two variables were receded into PAREDUC (Parent's education) Variable: 
1. Categories 8,9 and system missing for both variables were receded into the middle 
of the scale (4) . 
2. New variable was computed as a sum of the both Father Education and Mother's 
Education variables 
3. New variable was recoded into less intervals; intervals with lower numbers of 
responses were combined into single one, with total number of categories equaled 8. 1 is the 
lowest level of Parent's education and 8 the highest. 
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6. FAMILY INCOME 
Questio1maire item: 
What is your family income? 
1. Very low, poverty 
2. Low, almost poverty 
3 . Average 
4. High average, there is money for most of the expenses 
5 . My family has an unlimited spending potential 
7. LIKE-DISLIKE SCALE 
Please rate the following ethnic groups: 
Name of the ethnic Dislike Dislike Neutral Like 
group very 
much 
Russians l 2 3 4 
Ukrainians 1 2 3 4 
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